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The present assessment of Japanese intelligence operations during World War II 
is based almost entirely upon the work of Western researchers. The view presented is one 
of complete incompetence by the West. Little attention has been paid to any successes the 
Japanese intelligence organizations achieved. In fact, the majority of Anglo-American 
historians have instead focused on the errors and unpreparedness of the Allies as the 
cause of their early failures. This view is completely dismissive of Japanese intelligence 
efforts. The majority of the research does not take into account the extensive preparations 
and training the Japanese intelligence organizations and military undertook in the lead up 
to World War II. This information calls into question the assertion that Allied failures 
were the primary provenance of the early Japanese successes. 
This study focuses on the Japanese intelligence efforts from 1930 to 1942. It will 
analyze the events leading up to and the Invasion of Malaya. This was a pivotal event at 
the opening of World War II, and was a decisive Japanese victory. Previously, the 
success of Japanese forces during this, and other, event has been credited to failures in 
Allied intelligence and preparedness. Western sources at large have claimed that Japanese 




intelligence units were highly skilled and contributed greatly to Japanese successes. It 
was as a result of severe organizational deficiencies and failures that appeared in the 
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 1941, the Japanese First Air Fleet, designated Kido Butai or Mobile 
Unit/Force, refueled for the final time on their approach to Pearl Harbor. December 6
th
 
brought with it more, last minute, intelligence. Japanese submarines reported that the 
American fleet was not using its alternate anchorage. In the evening, the command staff 
had a final meeting during which they reviewed the operational plan one final time and 
assessed the latest intelligence reports to have been received. The last of the reports from 
their spy in Pearl Harbor arrived that night. The information that the operative sent was 
posted on the ready room boards for all the pilots to see in the morning. At noon of that 
same day, the Kido Butai had already adjusted its course due South and increased to full 
speed. Grand crews had already lined the aircraft up on the decks and readied them for 
combat while mechanics performed final inspections. By 6:15 a.m. approximately one 
hundred and eighty Japanese fighters, bombers, and torpedo planes had formed up. By 
7:00 a.m., using a radio direction finder tuned to a Honolulu station for guidance, 
Commander Fuchida Mitsuo (1902-1976) estimated his attacking aircraft were an hour 
out from their target. 
At 7:49 a.m. Admiral Nagumo Chuichi (1887-1944) received the infamous 
“TORA…TORA…TORA” radio message signaling that the attack on Pearl Harbor had 
commenced. Admiral Yamamoto also received that message, due to favorable 




The first bombs began to fall on the US fleet at 7:55 a.m. The first torpedo, loosed 
by Lt. Goto Inichi, struck the USS Oklahoma shortly after the first bombs were released. 
Chaos reigned as the unprepared American seamen attempted to discern at first whether it 
was an attack or insubordinate pilots barn storming the ships. Once the explosions began 
American servicemen struggled to get their ships under way, attend to damage control, 
and mount a defense. They categorically failed in all their efforts. The lone exception was 
the USS Nevada. The Nevada was the only battleship to get underway. The ship and its 
crew made a desperate dash for the open ocean but after taking several bomb hits and a 
torpedo strike they were forced to beach to prevent blocking the harbor entrance. 
Approximately one hour behind the first wave was the Japanese attack’s second wave. 
Arriving from several directions at once, they attacked Ford Island, Hickam Field and 
other vital aircraft facilities. The attack was over ninety minutes after the first bombs 
dropped. Pearl Harbor was devastated. The United States Pacific Fleet lie shattered on the 
harbor bottom. In the first fifteen minutes of the attack, the battleships USS Arizona and 
Oklahoma had been sunk while the USS California and West Virginia had been severely 
crippled. Five total battleships were sunk outright. The remaining battleships all received 
substantial damage and it would be three months before the least damaged of them 
returned to service. The Japanese had seemingly scored a decisive and demoralizing 
victory against the Americans.
1
 
In early 1941 top Japanese military commanders believed for a myriad of reasons 
that war with the United States was inevitable. As early as the 1920s America and Britain 
had been aware of the potential as Japan increased its imperial presence in the Pacific 
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region. Tensions between East and West escalated after Japan’s 1931 invasion of 
Manchuria. Japan spent much of the 1930s after the invasion attempting to isolate China 
from any Western help. Japan also began a more earnest attempt at becoming 
independent of the West for resources. This attempt led them to begin looking at the 
resource rich area of Southeast Asia that included possessions of the British Empire. 
In 1937, the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Nanking Massacre 
began to sway Western opinion against the Japanese. Great Britain, occupied with events 
in Europe, had little time or the resources to deal with the potential Japanese threat in the 
Pacific region. Likewise, America was in no position to resist the Japanese directly at this 
point. Americans in general were also opposed to entering another costly conflict, 
preferring to let the Europeans deal with their own mess. As a result, the Western powers 
supplied the Chinese with money for their war supplies, hoping to stem the Japanese 
advance. In 1940, the Japanese invaded French Indochina. Their goals were to stop the 
influx of war supplies to China and to take control of the natural resources of the region. 
The United States in turn placed an embargo on all manufactured goods and resources 
going to Japan that it deemed to be war material. Oil was still allowed to be exported due 
in large part to the belief that to restrict its sale to Japan would be considered an extreme 
provocation. Aviation fuel, though, was on the list of goods embargoed.  
The unmistakable escalation of Japanese aggression in the Pacific region forced 
the United States to face the reality that war with Japan was a very distinct possibility. 
American leadership was still uncertain at this point as to what they would do in the case 
of war between the two nations. In 1940 following naval exercises, President Franklin D. 




incredibly useful as a forward naval base, but it had never been primary fleet base. The 
re-location of the Pacific fleet clearly was meant as a deterrent to further Japanese 
aggression in the emerging Pacific theater. Japanese war planners now felt that a 
preemptive strike against the Americans was necessary in order to ensure their plans on 
moving into what they referred to as the Southern Area.
2
 This area included British 
holding like Malaya and Singapore and the Japanese command believed that strikes 
against these resource rich British territories would draw the Americans into a conflict. 
In January 1941 the Japanese Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku authored a paper that 
would be the origin of the attack plan that the Japanese Combined Fleet would execute in 
December of that same year. Yamamoto’s paper was unequivocal in its thesis. The 
Imperial Japanese Navy had to strike first and strike hard. Yamamoto pointed to the fact 
that the IJN had never won a scenario that involved reactionary tactics. As part of a 
multi-pronged thrust into the Pacific the IJN and IJA would have to work together to take 
key territories away from the West. One of the targets was Pearl Harbor. There 
Yamamoto declared that the IJN should attack using naval airpower as its primary 
offensive weapon and follow that success up with an extensive blockade conducted by 
IJN submarines. Yamamoto then requested that a naval aviator not indoctrinated within 
the traditional ideology of decisive naval battle doctrine to study the proposed project. 
Yamamoto received the results of that feasibility study sometime in March or April of 
1941. It was within this period that the order was given to begin drawing up the actual 
battle plans for air attack on the naval base at Pearl Harbor.
3
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The Japanese, as part of an overall ongoing naval intelligence gathering effort at 
the time, had sent naval officers under official cover as civilians to each of its embassies. 
The officers would direct espionage operations in addition to actively gathering 
intelligence themselves. In Hawaii this person was Yoshikawa Takeo. Yoshikawa’s 
reason for being in Hawaii was because of this intelligence effort and not as a direct 
result of the planning of the attack on Pearl Harbor. In fact evidence shows that at the 
same time Yoshikawa was arriving in Hawaii the first order to create an attack plan was 
being issued in Japan. This did not mean that he did not contribute to the Pearl Harbor 
attack plan. As his mission continued the intelligence he gathered would be utilized in the 
plan that was developed.
4
 
On a clear March afternoon in 1941 a Japanese liner nosed its way into a berth on 
the Hawaiian Island of Oahu. As the passengers disembarked, an official of the Japanese 
Consulate met a lone slim man in his late twenties. After receiving the traditional 
Hawaiian lei greeting the young man, whose papers identified him as Morimura Tadashi, 
was guided through customs by the consular agent who met him. Mormura was then 
taken to the consulate on Nuuana Avenue. Once there Morimura was introduced to his 
co-workers and shown to his residence within the consular compound. He was then given 
a rather innocuous title at the consulate, one that both the Consul and Vice Consul had 
known would hide his true task. 
 Morimura had spent years preparing for his real mission: to keep the Japanese 
Navy informed of the readiness of the U.S. Pacific Fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor. He 
had begun by familiarizing himself with the various military installations located in the 
Hawaiian Islands while simultaneously studying English so that he could glean all the 
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information possible from periodicals like the New York Times.  He also studied naval 
theory, read the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan, and studied Jane’s Fighting Ships, 
memorizing the silhouettes of all the American vessels. His task was to monitor the 
activities, movements, and daily routine of the American fleet. He would then send this 
information back through the consulate in reports to Japan. Ultimately, this intelligence 
would aide in the planned attack on Pearl Harbor. 
 Over the months Morimura painstakingly recorded the patterns of most of the U.S. 
military activity on the islands. He never trespassed on government property and never 
committed any outright acts of espionage. Instead, Morimura gathered all of his 
intelligence through open sourcing and human intelligence. He was no different from the 
local law enforcement and Federal analysts working in the United States today, or the 
numerous attachés and businessmen working for the U.S. government observing the 
goings on in whatever nation they are residing in. He gained valuable information from 
local residents and servicemen at bars and in social environments, primarily as a result of 
the openness of these targets. He combed through local, national, and international papers 
to find corroborating data. He relied on his memory, avoiding cameras and notepads that 
may have drawn attention to him. 
 Morimura also was careful in his intelligence gathering habits. He never overused 
any one location or method. There was one exception. Morimura did have a preferred 
restaurant, the Shunchu-ro, which sat on the side of Alewa Heights.
5
 That particular 
establishment afforded him an excellent view of Ford Island and Hickam Field. It also 
served to re-enforce his cover as a hard drinking, womanizing, Japanese government 
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worker. Other times he would dress as a common day laborer and spend time in the cane 
fields on the slopes of Aiea that conveniently overlooked the submarine facilities in Pearl. 
These locations and techniques helped Morimura to gather the information that would be 
critical to the success of the Japanese attack on December 7
th
 of that same year. 
The narrative above may read like a work of historical fiction, but these events 
actually took place. Morimura Tadashi’s real name was Yoshikawa Takeo (1914-1993). 
Yoshikawa provided the Imperial Japanese Navy with invaluable information, used to 
plan its attack on the US Pacific Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor. Yoshikawa’s intelligence 
helped to eliminate other, less strategic, targets on the island so that the planners could 
focus solely on the fleet at Pearl Harbor.
6
 The intelligence he provided may even have 
resulted in the decision to use bombs on the American battleships in addition to 
torpedoes.
7
 By the time of the attack Yoshikawa not only knew the names of most of the 
American ships, but he also knew their schedules down to the day. The largely complete 
picture that Yamamoto and his planners had of Pearl Harbor and American military 
activity on the islands, thanks to Yoshikawa’s efforts, contributed directly to the success 
of the attack on December 7
th
. 
 Yoshikawa was no slouch. He had been a graduate of the Imperial Japanese Naval 
Academy and had served on capital ships in the Navy. Additionally, Yoshikawa had 
undergone training in both submarines and naval aviation, but forced to retire early for 
medical reasons cutting short a promising career. Approximately two years after his 
discharge, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) approached him and offered him a position 
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7
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in its intelligence division. Yoshikawa’s extensive naval training made him a valuable 
asset and potentially the most valuable spy in Hawaii. Over the next few years 
Yoshikawa studied everything that was available to him on the United States Navy and 
its many Pacific bases. In 1940 he was given his assignment which posted him in Hawaii 
and tasked him with keeping the IJN command informed of the current status of the U.S. 
fleet. This assignment would end up becoming part of the overall strategy devised by 
Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku that called for a surprise aerial attack on Pearl Harbor as the 
opening gambit of war with the U.S. As the only military asset in the Hawaiian Islands, 
the intelligence that Yoshikawa passed on proved invaluable to Yamamoto in his 
planning.
8
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 Yoshikawa Takeo’s activities in Hawaii represent a highly developed and 
sophisticated approach to intelligence operations. His training and approach to his 
mission was on par with Japan’s Western counterparts. Yet, Western scholars, both 
British and American, have readily dismissed Japanese intelligence as faulty. Instead, 
they focus on Western intelligence failures as being the source of Japanese successes in 
the first half of the Second World War. This thesis will argue the opposite. It will argue 
that the Japanese had an intelligence apparatus that was as developed as those possessed 
by its Western counterparts. It will analyze the Japanese espionage operations, in 
particular those of the Imperial Japanese Army, conducted in preparation for the Invasion 
of Malaya. The battle will be used as a case study to analyze Japanese intelligence 
contributions to the overall success of that military operation. It will focus heavily on the 
contributions made by the famous Japanese intelligence unit F Kikan as related by its 
commander Fujiwara Iwaichi (1908-1986) in his memoir F. Kikan: Japanese Intelligence 
Operations in Southeast Asia during World War II. This thesis will analyze the 
intelligence operations of F Kikan using the Intelligence cycle as defined by the Office of 




implemented during the war. The ODNI has simply provided a clear and concise 
definition of the individual steps involved and the methods of collection.
9
 
Yoshikawa Takeo’s training and activities were not unique among the various 
branches of Japanese intelligence. Instead, he is typical of the effort that the Japanese 
exerted in order to field highly capable operatives. Despite the revelations of 
Yoshikawa’s activities there is still considerable conjecture over the capabilities and 
effectiveness of operatives like him and over Japanese intelligence as a whole. Some 
historians like W.J. Holmes have credited the work Yoshikawa did as being vital to the 
success to the strike on Pearl Harbor. Yet other historians like David Kahn have argued 
that Yoshikawa was more interested in dalliances with local Japanese-American women 
that life on the Hawaiian Islands provided him. Kahn’s analysis painted Yoshikawa as 
being unhappy with both his assignment and the people with whom he worked. As a 
result, Yoshikawa focused on his own personal gratification instead of tending to his 
duties. R.B. Stinnet even goes so far as to claim that Imperial Japanese Army and Navy 
intelligence officers were badly trained. The speculation that surrounds Yoshikawa’s 
activities and achievements is representative of the larger, Western, view of Japanese 
intelligence activities during World War II. When the subject of intelligence during the 
war is brought up, scholars tend to go straight to speaking about the ingenious complexity 
of the Enigma machine and the herculean efforts of the Allies to decipher it. In such 
discussions the Germans often receive as much praise for their ingenuity as the Allied 
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codebreakers. Meanwhile in any similar discussion about the Pacific war, historians 
belittle and ignore Japanese intelligence efforts. This thesis will take a critical look at 
Japanese intelligence capabilities and argue that they were better than given credit for 
using an analysis of the intelligence operations that preceded the Battle of Malaya. 
The following study will look at the Japanese development of their intelligence apparatus 
in the years prior to the Second World War. It will examine their use of intelligence operations at 
its onset. The thesis will look specifically at the Japanese intelligence systems employed prior to 
and during the Battle of Malaya. The Invasion of Malaya, like the attack on Pearl Harbor, was a 
pivotal event that occurred in late 1941. Both were decisive Japanese victories. In each case the 
success of the Japanese forces has been credited to epic failures in Allied intelligence and 
preparedness. Historian David Kahn has said that the Japanese intelligence services experienced 
success in only the most extraordinary and propitious of conditions. The attack on Pearl Harbor, 
often, is still referred to as “… the greatest shock ever sustained by the United States.”
10
 Western 
sources have claimed that Japanese intelligence was faulty. This project will argue that in fact 
Japanese intelligence units were highly skilled and contributed considerably to Japanese military 
successes. It would be because of the development of severe organizational deficiencies, internal 
failures, and inter-service rivalry during the second half of the conflict that Japan would fall 
behind in the intelligence war and eventually succumb to defeat. 
Exploration of Thesis 
 Not until the 1970s did the world learn of the complex role intelligence played in 
the Allied victory in WWII. The story of intelligence operations during the Second World 
War first started in 1973 with revelations about the Enigma cipher machine and the 
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ULTRA program. Gustave Bertrand published his work Enigma ou la plus grande 
énigme de la guerre 1939-1945 in that year and for the first time revealed the multi-
national effort that went into breaking the German cryptographic system. Bertrand’s book 
led to the even larger disclosure of the critical role intelligence played in tactical, 
strategic, and operational planning. For the first time scholars began to realize the 
tremendous impact intelligence had on the events of WWII. This in turn led to a serious 
revision to the historiography of the war.
11
 
 Britain followed suit in 1979, publishing its official history of intelligence 
operations during the Second World War titled British Intelligence in the Second World 
War. The multi-volume tome, edited by Sir Francis Harry Hinsley, illuminated the extent 
to which the British used intelligence operations during the war and their importance to 
its outcome. In particular, the work goes into extensive detail about the use of 
information and dis-information. Allied deceptions at Normandy, counter-intelligence 
operations, and the decryption of Enigma are all detailed in its pages. Because of the 
American desire to keep its own intelligence capabilities a secret, British Intelligence was 
limited in its scope to events and actors in the European Theater of Operations (ETO).
12
 
Those initial works have heavily influenced the World War II narrative. That 
influence is apparent today in works like Andrew Roberts’ 2009 publishing, The Storm of 
War: A New History of the Second World War. In his book Roberts illustrated how the 
relationship between German General Erwin Rommel and British Field Marshal Bernard 
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Montgomery had to be re-evaluated. Montgomery “… had the invaluable advantage of 
being able to read Rommel’s Enigma communications, Montgomery knew how short the 
Germans were of men, ammunition, food and above all fuel.”
13
 The Allied victory in the 
ETO is now understood to have been due in large part to its extensive intelligence 
apparatus. Since Bertrand’s original revelations the overall contribution of intelligence to 
operations in the ETO has emerged as a complex and detailed picture. The intricate 
nature of this story is possible because of the unparalleled access that the Allies had to 
Axis, in particular German, personnel and records at the end of the conflict. The result 
has been that scholars from all walks of academia have been able to ascertain the 
strengths and weaknesses of the various intelligence organizations and the impact that 
they had on operations and decision-making. Historians in particular have the ability to 
examine and understand the cultural, bureaucratic, and ideological factors that influenced 
the operation of intelligence agencies. Unfortunately, the same conditions that added to 
our understanding of the intelligence war in the ETO did not exist in the Pacific theater at 
the end of the war.
14
 
The United States and its allies did not get the same kind of access to the Japanese 
personnel and documents that they had gotten in the ETO. Unlike the conditions in 
Europe where geographic distances were relatively short and the Allies had invaded the 
very capital of their foe, the Pacific Ocean is a vast expanse of nothingness dotted 
infrequently by small spits of land. One of the results of the combination of the 
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geography of the Pacific Theater of Operations (PTO) and the overall American strategy 
to defeat the Japanese was that no Allied soldier actually set foot on Japanese home soil 
prior to the surrender in Tokyo Bay. Thanks to the large geographic separation there was 
over a month delay between the end of the war in the Pacific and the arrival of the first 
occupation forces in September of 1945. In that interim period Japanese intelligence 
personnel had been busy. The intelligence branch of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) 
had embarked on an extensive burn campaign that destroyed the majority of their 
cryptanalytic work. Code breakers went underground. Authorities removed the names of 
intelligence operatives and personnel from rosters, or declared them dead. These 
preparations allowed the Japanese to feign ignorance once the occupiers arrived and 
began asking questions. The Americans too, were planning on playing “stupid” so to 
speak. The U.S. had been successful in the breaking of Japanese codes. As a result the US 
knew that the Japanese were not as incompetent as they were playing. The Americans 
participated in the charade because to reveal the Japanese duplicity in this matter could 
have potentially disclosed their own extensive capabilities. A giant game of balderdash 
ensued. Complicating the situation were the extreme racial prejudices held at the time. In 
the end Nazis were still white Europeans who had become misguided. The Japanese on 
the other hand were viewed as sub-human as a result of their Eastern origin, and 
dehumanized further by wartime propaganda. Ultimately, both sides were able to protect 
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Despite the fragmentary nature of the available information on Japanese 
intelligence during WW II a satisfactory history can still be constructed. There is an 
abundance of information readily available for current historians to utilize. The National 
Institute for Defense Studies in Shinjuku, Tokyo Japan houses an extensive collection of 
documents dating from 1865 forward. They are divided between the army, navy, and the 
Ministry of Defense. Many of the records are available digitally. Unfortunately, a greater 
number of them have yet to be translated and scanned as reading eighty-year-old hand 
writing presents a unique challenge, especially when it is in the Japanese language. The 
U.S. National Archives houses the World War II Collection of Seized Documents: Japan. 
This collection consists of copies of everything brought to America at the end of the war. 
Many of these records also go back to the mid-1860s. Additionally, there are the 
documents that have been emerging thanks to the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act which 
also encompasses information related to Japan. Finally, there exist an impressive number 
of oral and first person histories published in both English and Japanese. Fujiwara 
Iwaichi’s memoir, which will be used heavily in this work, is one such example. With 
this information it should be possible to create a moderately detailed summary of 
Japanese intelligence capabilities prior to and during the war. Furthermore, it may be 
possible to construct a framework with which it may be possible to start telling a more 
nuanced history of the subject.
16
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Current scholars in the field claim that it is impossible to form a thorough 
understanding of Japanese intelligence during the war. This is a direct result of the 
fragmented nature of the information possessed. Edward Drea has asserted that the 
evidence possessed is circumstantial at best, and “… there cannot be any certainty about 
how the Japanese used their cryptographic treasures.”
17
 Drea also questions whether any 
cryptanalytic successes the Japanese did have even mattered due to the infighting and 
bureaucratic issues that divided the intelligence services. These issues, while present at 
the start of the conflict, would not dominate Japan’s intelligence landscape until the latter 
half of the war. This claim writes off all operational failure as a result of internal 
disorganization and strife while simultaneously denoting that the intelligence 
organizations were failures. At the very least the claim marginalizes the early pre-war and 
initial wartime efforts and successes the Japanese did have in the intelligence arena. To 
subjectively discount the intelligence abilities of the Japanese based on operational 
outcomes, missing data, and the end result of the war does a disservice to both sides in 
the conflict. Despite the fact the Japanese ultimately lost the intelligence war, it is 
essential that historians construct as accurate a narrative as possible. To that end, it is 
possible to create such a history by using the available primary and secondary 
information. 
This thesis would not be the first attempt at piecing together a history in this 
manner. In fact, it draws its inspiration from the work of Revolutionary War historian 
Woody Holton. In his book Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the Making 
of the American Revolution in Virginia Holton successfully presents the argument that the 
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Virginia Founding Fathers were forced into acting by those who were socially and 
economically beneath them. Traditionally, the Founders are viewed as having led the 
common people who have been voiceless in most of history. The lack of primary 
evidence that surrounded these groups did not deter Holton. Holton constructed the 
framework for his argument using what does exist: newspapers, records of town meetings, 
reports on social events, and commentary in the journals and personal writing of the elites. 
From there he was able to extrapolate the unknowns to form a coherent argument that 
provides a new understanding of the events and forces that motivated the Founders. In a 
similar manner, this thesis will look at the knowns and attempt to extrapolate the 
unknowns in an effort to create a more thorough understanding of Japanese intelligence 
operations. By analyzing information that is directly linked and tangentially connected to 
Japanese intelligence efforts, it may be possible to construct the necessary framework to 
better analyze the Japanese intelligence operations of WWII. 
Review of Literature/Historiography 
 Starting in the 1970s with the revelations about the ULTRA project, historians 
have been examining the role of intelligence during World War II. The impact of intelligence on 
the war has been scrutinized from the lowest level operations to the creation of overall strategy. 
From this analysis, a general picture has emerged, at least in regards to the European Theater of 
Operations. The Allies enjoyed considerable superiority over their opponents in the field of 
intelligence in this picture. The contribution of Allied intelligence operations to the Allied war 
effort was a major facilitator in their eventual victory. The deciphering of the Enigma cypher and 
Operation Bodyguard are both prime examples of the importance of intelligence to the outcome 
of the war. Furthermore, access to the Axis powers’ records and personnel after the war have 




contributed to the pursuit of the war. This work has created an understanding of the many aspects 
that constituted Hitler’s and the German’s conduct of the war. This is not the case with the study 
of intelligence in the Pacific theater.
18
 
The present assessment of Japanese intelligence operations during World War II is based 
almost entirely upon the work of Western researchers using Western sources. This work heavily 
favors the idea that early Allied failures were solely a result of unpreparedness and their later 
successes derived wholly from their achievements. Central to this idea is the theme of overall 
ineffectiveness in the Japanese intelligence services. At the start of the war the Japanese racked 
up a remarkable string of successes. The vast majority of intelligence histories, though, refuse to 
credit the Japanese and their intelligence efforts for setting the stage for their victories. Most 
historians point instead to the flaws and weaknesses of the West as the as the primary basis for 
the Japanese superiority at places like Malaya and Pearl Harbor. Almost no credit is given to the 
Japanese for their performance, especially at the onset of the war, instead Allied errors are 
credited. The work of historians like David Kahn tends to support this view. Kahn has dismissed 
Japanese SIGINT efforts entirely and overall has painted a picture of the Japanese being 
ineffective, incapable, and developmentally behind the West in terms of intelligence capability. 
Then there are a select few historians, such as Edward Drea, who feel it is impossible to make any 
real determination about the effectiveness of Japanese intelligence capabilities based on the 
available evidence. There is still another line of thought, though, that has begun to emerge. 
Spearheaded by Dr. Ken Kotani, this line of thinking argues that Japanese intelligence 
organizations were not inept. Instead they suffered from a lack of status, central organization, and 
efficiency.
19
 Edward Drea also raised this idea in the conclusion of his paper on Japanese 
communications intelligence between 1920 and 1941 when he stated that “Whether or not 
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Japanese cryptanalytic victories mattered in an intelligence system divided against itself is a 
question that awaits an answer.”
20
 
 The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor is one of the most widely studied intelligence failures 
of World War II. The common conclusion is that there were plenty of warnings available prior to 
the attack that signaled Japanese intentions. In fact, frequently the assertion is that the U.S. had 
ample information about Japanese intentions because of intercepted communications and broken 
codes. Gordon Prange’s 1981 book At Dawn We Slept examines the events leading up to the 
attack and his effort focus on the gathering of intelligence during the period prior to December 7
th
. 
His work is valuable in helping to understand the revisionist viewpoint of the events. The primary 
claim that has manifested because of looking at the intelligence America gathered prior to the 
attack is that the Japanese success was the result of an American intelligence failure. David 
Kahn’s article, “The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor”, is an example of this assessment. He 
directly attributes the success of the attack to two major defects in American operations. The first 
was the lack of centralized intelligence and the second a lack of co-ordination between the 
military commands.
21
 This assessment though continually fails to realize the scope of Japanese 
preparations prior to the attack and in doing so reveals its major flaw. 
 Edward Drea, an eminent scholar who specializes in Japanese military affairs, takes a 
slightly different approach. In his article “Reading Each Other’s Mail: Japanese Communication 
Intelligence, 1920-1941” he points out that currently there exists a fragmented history of Japanese 
intelligence accomplishments. This is the result of several factors that when combined may, 
potentially, make resolving this convoluted and fractured story incredibly difficult. Key to the 
mess historians currently must deal with is the fact that Japanese intelligence organizations 
pursued a vigorous and thorough burn policy at the end of the war. Compounding this was the 
fact that many of the surviving agents remained in hiding for fear of reprisals and have now 
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passed on, leaving their stories untold. Drea maintains that a thorough understanding of the 
dynamics that existed between intelligence and military planning is not possible. His assertion is 
based on the belief that historians possess little of the necessary evidence and that what they do 
have is circumstantial at best. Instead of making assertions one way or another, Drea’s work 
attempts to describe the known and expand on that knowledge. This allows him in the end to push 
aside the assertion that Japanese intelligence was wholly inept. Instead, Drea points out that it is 
now known Japanese intelligence was far more successful than previously credited. The question 




 Dr. Ken Kotani has no patience for the depiction of Japanese intelligence as being 
incompetent or for the claim that Allied failures alone spawned Japanese success. In his book 
Japanese Intelligence in World War II he argues that the officers of Japanese intelligence were 
accomplished at performing their job. He posits that their downfall was a result of insufficient 
resources and a de-centralized intelligence organization. The fact that operations staff looked 
down on intelligence officers, coupled with the severe internal competition between the various 
organizations, only served to exacerbate the issues. Kotani points out that despite the contribution 
of intelligence officers in multiple tactical successes, like Pearl Harbor, they were not allowed to 
take part in strategic planning. The author points to events like the invasion of French Indochina 
as an example. The 1
st
 group, operations, ignored intelligence’s opposition to the invasion and 
kept them in the dark throughout the entire planning process. Despite a successful outcome, the 
invasion resulted in America cutting off the all-important export of oil to Japan. This was a 
potential outcome intelligence had feared. 
 Kotani and his works are only the most recent additions to the literature that originated in 
Japan itself. Like America, intelligence studies in Japan have been for the most part ignored until 
recently. What literature does exist offers vital clues to answering the question about why Japan 
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lost the intelligence war. In 1994, retired Colonel Ariga Tsutao published his book Nihon Riku 
Kai Gun no Jyoho Kiko Sono Katsudo (The Organization and Activities of the IJA and IJN). This 
work was instrumental in opening the way for increased work in the field. By far the largest work 
done on the history of Japanese Intelligence was Rikugun Nakano Gakko (Nakano Army School) 
and published in 1978. The book is a wide-ranging survey of the espionage activities and training 
of the IJA. The book spans the time from the Sino-Japanese War to the end of the Second World 
War. Graduates of the school, known for turning out highly trained and competent intelligence 
officers, compiled and edited the work. 
 Many former Japanese officers have left us with their memoirs. These important works 
provide an inside look at Japanese intelligence activities. Several volumes appeared just prior to 
and during the Pacific War. They dealt with the long history of Japanese Counter-Intelligence 
efforts. Nihon Bocho shi (History of Japanese Counter-Intelligence) traces the history of the 
subject back to the eighth century. The Japanese Military Police, known as the Kenpei-Tai, edited 
their own official history in 1939. In 1975, well after the end of World War II, the Military Police 
Officers Association edited another volume entitled Nihon Kenpei Seishi (Official Japanese 
Military Police History). They put out yet a third history in the early 1980s. These works go into 
significant detail about the covert operations that took place in Manchuria, China, and Southeast 
Asia. 
The Japanese Military Police were not the only former combatants that were writing 
memoirs. Several members of both the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Imperial Japanese Army 
also wrote about their experiences before, during, and after the Pacific War. Retired Captain 
Motonao Samejima and retired Lieutenant Kenichi Nakamuta both left copious amounts of 
personal papers that recollected their codebreaking missions during the Pacific War. Motonao’s 
work was titled Moto Gunreibu Tsushin Kacho no Kaiso (Memoir of an ex-Chief of 
Communications, Navy General Staff) and published in 1981, while Kenichi’s effort was titled 




former Vice Admiral Toshiyuki Yokoi wrote about the IJN’s codebreaking efforts starting in the 
1920s and proceeding through the end of the Pacific War. The book was titled Nihon no 
Kimitsushitsu (Japanese Black Chamber). Imai Takeo, a former Major General, wrote Showa no 
Boryaku (Conspiracies in the Showa Era) in 1967. His book revealed some of the intelligence 
operations that the IJA had been running in China and Manchuria. In 1972 retired Captain Yuzuru 
Sanematsu wrote Joho Senso (Intelligence War) in which he described his duties as part of the 




 It is apparent that the current view of Japanese intelligence operations during World War 
II is flawed. It is unacceptable to assert that the only reason the Japanese enjoyed any success was 
due to the failures of others. Even though the Allied advantage in the Pacific was obvious much 
sooner than in Europe, there is strong evidence that Japanese intelligence was not the problem. 
The question then becomes where the problem, if there was one, existed? The question is not 
easily answered because the role of Japanese intelligence organizations and their effectiveness is 
murky at best. This is a result of the combination of several factors. The destruction of the vast 
majority of intelligence documents at the end of the war and the reclusiveness of Japanese 
operatives after the war are two of these components. Edward Drea feels because of this lack of 
evidence it is currently impossible to make a determination on the effectiveness of Japanese 
intelligence during the war. For Drea, and for this research, the question to answer is, what effect 
did the organization and structure of the intelligence services have on overall Japanese 
intelligence and military performance? Answering this question can give historians a more 
accurate and complete picture of Japanese intelligence during World War II. 
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The present assessment of Japanese intelligence operations during World War II is based 
almost entirely upon the work of Western researchers. The narrative as presented thus suffers 
from fundamental flaws. The most important of these flaws is that effective Japanese intelligence 
operations do not receive credit for the success of events like the attack on Pearl Harbor and the 
Invasion of Malaya. Instead, their triumphs belong to American and Allied intelligence failures. 
While this may in part be true, to ignore the intelligence operations of the Japanese as wholly 
ineffective is a mistake.  What attention granted to any victories the different Japanese 
intelligence organizations achieved often comes in the form of conspiracy books. Books like 
Charles Beard’s President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941, John Toland’s Infamy, and 
Betrayal at Pearl Harbor by James Rusbridger. In fact, many Anglo-American historians have 
instead chosen to focus on the errors and unpreparedness of the Allies as the cause of their early 
failures. This view is completely dismissive of Japanese intelligence efforts. Much of this 
research does not consider the extensive preparations and training the Japanese intelligence 
organizations and military undertook in the years prior to World War II and is based heavily on 
Western sources. This information alone should call into question the assertion that Allied 
failures alone were the primary provenance of the early Japanese successes. 
Intelligence Overview 
If paying to poke someone is the world’s oldest profession, then paying someone 
to poke around in somebody else’s business is easily the second oldest. Espionage, the 
oldest subset of intelligence gathering, has a history as old as mankind. The Ancient 
Greeks used spies extensively as did the Roman Empire. The ancient writings of generals, 
philosophers, and advisors often contained advice on the use of espionage as part of a 
successful military strategy. The Chinese classic The Art of War by Sun-Tzu and the 
Artasastra by the Indian philosopher Chanakya are both notable examples of classic 




having an extremely adept intelligence system. Espionage is even found within the Bible. 
Recorded in the book of Numbers is the story of Joshua, Caleb, and the twelve spies sent 
forth by Moses into the Promised Land to assess whether or not it was suitable for the 
Israelites. 




 centuries espionage continued to be practiced 
extensively by both the East and West. Like previous shoguns, the Tokugawa shogunate 
of Japan employed espionage to manage and control the daimyo and samurai. The 
shogunate realized that it needed some manner of discovering internal corruption and 
dissent throughout Japan. The Metsuke were officially the censors of the Tokugawa 
shogunate. Unofficially they operated as the shogun’s personal intelligence agency. They 
were tasked with reporting any events, situations, or conversations back to officials in 
Edo that showed evidence of dissent, corruption, or maladministration. They functioned 
in a similar fashion to the manner in which attachés do in the modern intelligence world. 
In the West the efforts of the shogunate are embodied most famously in the form of the 
legendary ninja. In reality the shogunate’s actual efforts were much more practical and 
far less fanciful. The Mongols also used espionage extensively during their conquests in 
Asia and Europe. Meanwhile, in the Americas, the Aztecs learned how to use the 
individuals in their society that were in charge of commerce as spies. Additionally, prior 
to a battle or conflict, the Aztecs would send members of their own tribe out among their 
enemy. These individuals would speak the local dialect and wear the local attire, not 
unlike human intelligence (HUMINT) assets today.
24
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Since its incorporation, the definition of intelligence and its purpose have changed 
little. Intelligence is the information, regardless of source, collected from both within and 
outside a parent nation. That data can pertain to direct or indirect threats, to the parent 
nation, its people, its property, and may include any number of the aforementioned 
circumstances or include them all. The intelligence may also involve reporting on the 
development of new technologies, offensive or defensive, the propagation of weapons 
and weapon systems within a nation, region or hemisphere, and more recently, the 
proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The accumulated 
information is then processed and used to understand a perceived opponent or threat, to 
discern the consequences of any action taken politically or militarily, inform negotiations 
and policy decisions, aid internal security and first responders. The process by which all 
of this is done is now known as the Intelligence Cycle.
25
 
 In U.S. National Intelligence: An Overview 2013, a report written and published 
by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Intelligence Cycle is defined as 
“the process of developing raw information into finished intelligence for use by 
policymakers, military commanders, and other consumers in decision making.”
26
 It is a 
cyclical six step process that is designed to be dynamic and repeatable at the same time. 
Those six steps in order are: 1) Planning and Direction; 2) Collection; 3) Processing and 
Exploitation; 4) Analysis and Production; 5) Dissemination and; 6) Evaluation. The final 
step is unique in that is occurs at the end of each of the previous steps in addition to 
occurring for the process as a whole.
27
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 The first step, referred to as the Planning and Direction stage, provides the 
impetus for the entire intelligence cycle. In the modern parlance direction often comes 
from a specific requirement provided by the consumer for specific project. In this 
instance the direction aspect precedes the planning phase. The refined intelligence that is 
provided to the consumer is referred to as the product and it may consist of any number 
of things individually or as a combination of them. Some examples of products are full 
reports, graphics, and raw data that has been collected and processed but not analyzed. 
Depending on the customer’s requirements the intelligence organization(s) assigned with 
generating the product will proceed with planning.
28
 
 The second step in the Intelligence cycle is the gathering of the raw data for the 
project. There are five primary sources of intelligence. They are Geospatial Intelligence 
(GEOINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Measurement and Signature Intelligence 
(MASINT), Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT), and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). Data 
collection is conducted in a manner that assembles information related to the product in 
as many of the aspects of intelligence as possible. Sources of information can range from 
newspapers and social networking sites to complex clandestine aerial surveillance and 
satellite imagery. Once the intelligence needed to produce the finished product has been 
amassed the next step in the cycle can begin. 
 In the third step of the Intelligence Cycle, Processing and Exploitation, the raw 
data from the previous step is refined into a form that is more readily usable.
29
 The 
Processing and Exploitation phase of the Intelligence Cycle uses highly trained and 
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specialized individuals and complex equipment to make the collected intelligence usable 
by the analyst in the next step. During this step imagery is interpreted, data is translated if 
necessary, if possible it is decrypted, and then it is organized in a manner that makes 
analysis both easier and more efficient.
30
 
 The fourth step in the Intelligence Cycle is Analysis and Production. As with the 
preceding step this one also utilizes highly trained and specialized people and equipment 
to give meaning to the refined intelligence. The processed intelligence is synthesized into 
a finished product that produces actionable intelligence.
31
 In some instances this step may 
be skipped as a result of time constraints or the requirements of the customer. An 
excellent example of this occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Kennedy 
only needed the actual quantity of Soviet equipment in Cuba and facts on Soviet activities. 
As a result no analysis was required.
32
 
 Dissemination of the completed intelligence product to the customer is the fifth 
step in the Intelligence Cycle. There are multiple methods of dissemination in today’s 
world. Hardcopy, electronic distribution, and formal briefings are all used. Most finished 
intelligence will be distributed through multiple if not all avenues. It is during this phase 
when evaluation may uncover gaps in the intelligence and identify new pertinent 
questions that need answered in order to fulfill the consumer’s original requirements. 
More often than not, the Intelligence Cycle begins anew at this point.
33
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 The final step in the Intelligence Cycle is Evaluation. This step is unique in the 
fact that it exists in a specific point within the cycle but also throughout it. At the end of 
every cycle feedback is acquired and used to refine both the process and the intelligence 
as whole. At the same time constant evaluation exists in every step in order to better 
fulfill the customers’ requirements in the present and the future. The feedback is used to 
refine techniques and activities and to develop new more effective methods of collecting 




 Intelligence gathering falls into five basic categories as previously mentioned. 
They are HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, GEOINT, and MASINT. Despite the modern 
naming and acronym conventions these practices have been around for most of human 
history. The one exception is MASINT, not formally recognized until 1986, and where 
the other four categories collect direct evidence, MASINT tends to be indirect. Together 
these different types of intelligence and their collection techniques provide intelligence 
organizations with all of the raw data they require to fulfill their missions. 
 Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) is technically derived 
information. It relies on data sources other than imagery and signals. MASINT is a 
product of the technological age we live in and often relies on optical information in 
visual spectrums that humans cannot perceive. It also includes radio frequency analysis, 
acoustics, seismology, and the use of material sciences in achieving its objectives. The 
tools used for MASINT collection include computers with advanced software suites, 
satellites, and drones. The final intelligence product for MASINT is a result of the 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of the information collected through these means. 
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 Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is the collection of information via a human 
source. This is the category that the majority of people think of when they think of 
intelligence work. James Bond is the epitome of this, idea, style of spy. In HUMINT is 
much broader than this preconceived understanding. HUMINT is the only one of the five 
categories where its collectors interact directly with the information sources- assets- 
directing their activities and conversations. The greatest advantage provided by HUMINT 




 Human Intelligence encompasses a wide range of activities. It can be high-level 
national security information all the way down to low-level unit or individual specific 
missions. HUMINT is further divided into two main categories, overt collection and 
covert collection. Overt collection includes but is not limited to the debriefing of persons 
who travelled to locations and nations of interest, diplomatic reports from embassies, law 
enforcement reports on criminal activities, and reports on host country officials’ reactions 
to U.S. policy. In overt collections the collector meets openly with sources and declares 
their position as an official representative of the U.S. Government.
37
 
 Covert operations, often-referred to as clandestine operations, are those conducted 
in secret on foreign soil.
38
 The collections officer, usually under the cover of a NOC 
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(Non-Official Cover), will attempt to develop discreetly a relationship with a source that 
is close to the desired information. Ultimately, the goal is to get that source to divulge the 
intelligence that the collections officer’s nation desires. The methods used in this type of 
operation can vary. The source may be told of the collecting individual’s national 
affiliation, they may be persuaded via moral or ethical arguments, and the collection 
officer may utilize temptation in the form of vice or carnal pleasure. Money can also be a 
powerful motivator. Finally, blackmail is never out of the question. Once recruited the 
source is tightly controlled to protect both the collections officer and the source 
themselves. It is also imperative for the political safety of the nation doing the collecting 
that the operation eludes detection. This is one of the reasons that covert operatives often 
operate under a NOC and if captured are disavowed. This process if most often the 




 GEOINT is the acronym for geospatial intelligence and encompasses the 
exploitation and analysis of imagery as well as the exploitation and analysis of geospatial 
information. Variations of GEOINT have been around for as long as warring states have 
had armies. In the earliest times this involved the scouting and mapping of terrain. The 
result being the ability to pick positions and locations for battle that were favorable to 
one’s self. With the advent of photography imagery analysis comes into being. The most 
famous of which might be the pioneer aviators of WW1 taking reconnaissance photos of 
the trench works and lines of opposing forces. Today with the advent of satellites and 
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multi-spectrum video imagery GEOINT has entered a completely new realm and is one 
of the most important information sources intelligence agencies have at their disposal.
40
 
 Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) is derived from all the information that is 
publicly available. The data that is collected, processed through the intelligence cycle, 
and disseminated to the appropriate audience in a timely manner. OSINT pulls from a 
wide variety of sources: Newspapers, magazines, TV, social media, internet and 
computer based information, government reports, official data, directories and other 
forms of public data, Grey Literature, observation and reporting, and the availability of 
worldwide satellite imagery such as Google Earth.
41
 
 Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is the data that is collected from all data 
transmissions. This includes Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Electronic 
Intelligence (ELINT) and Foreign Instrumentation Intelligence (FISINT). COMINT 
involves analyzing traffic patterns. This was particularly useful in both World Wars as it 
provided a means to locate enemy naval units in the period before radio direction finding. 
It is also useful in determining who is involved with whom and what a potential hierarchy 
may be. It helps to establish links between different groups and can potentially reveal 
some of the meaning within the communication. FISINT is obtained by intercepting 
foreign electromagnetic transmissions. It involves such things such as telemetry data, 
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beacons, and video data links. Finally, ELINT is derived from electronic signals such as 
RADAR and other non-communicative signals.
42
 
Applying this intelligence model to the Japanese Pearl Harbor intelligence 
operations makes it clear that they were some of the finest of the war. First and foremost 
Japanese leadership utilized intelligence in their operational planning. This was 
something that would disappear as the war drew on and internal power struggles 
escalated. Yoshikawa Takeo’s mission in Hawaii is an excellent example of what can be 
learned by simply using openly available information, OSINT. It also stands as an 
example of top-notch HUMINT work. Yoshikawa’s frequent sightseeing trips around the 
islands allowed him to view and document US military installations from various vantage 
points. Restaurants, hotels, and even parks with “picturesque” views of Pearl Harbor 
allowed him to chart the numbers and locations of United States Navy (USN) ships. They 
also allowed him to keep track of their comings and goings. The various bars and dining 
establishments frequented by USN personnel gave Yoshikawa the opportunity to verify 
his observations and learn of new developments on the bases. American servicemen 
seemed more than willing to talk about things that to them appeared harmless. Yoshikawa 
also looked to newspapers and local publications that often detailed the stationing and 
deployment of vessels. In addition to the HUMINT, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) 
was also using Radio Direction Finding (RDF) to plot the deployment of USN 
warships.
43
 All of this intelligence and more would provide the basis for the attack that 
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Admiral Onishi Takijiro, Commander Genda Minoru, and Admial Yamamoto Isoroku 
planned.  
 The attack on Pearl Harbor, though, was just a small piece of a larger Japanese 
thrust into the Pacific. Pearl Harbor for America was a monumental failure and marked 
the country’s entrance into a war that it had not wanted. The reality was the attack, while 
important, was a side attraction to the larger invasion of Southeast Asia and its resource 
rich territories. The topic itself has also been well trod. Therefore in this work the 
intelligence activities of the Japanese leading up to and during the Battle of Malaya, an 
often-overlooked action, will be analyzed. The operations discussed will be classified 
into one of the four defined categories of SIGINT, HUMINT, GEOINT, and OSINT. The 
success of each will then be assessed according to how they contributed to Japan’s final 
victory in its Malayan campaign. The intelligence system employed by the Japanese will 
be examined and its effectiveness will be judged using Intelligence Cycle presented here. 







Historical Background: Japan’s Rise to Imperial Power 
 In 1868 the last feudal Japanese government came to an end and imperial rule was 
revived. The emperor, though, was more of a figurehead in the same vein that the British 
monarchy is today. Real political power rested with the newly established national 
assembly. The establishment of the Meiji Restoration soon followed. Its beginning also 
signaled the start of Japan’s rapid transformation into a modern regional imperial power. 
The Meiji Restoration was a vast plan of social, political, and technological reforms 
triggered by the realization that the nation lagged far behind its Western counterparts. By 
the 1890s Japan emerged as an economic powerhouse that stood on equal footing with 
many of the Western powers. Japan accomplished in thirty years what it had taken the 
West almost two hundred years to do. Practically overnight, its economy and industry 
modernized. This revolution was reacting, in large part, to the threat that the Western 
colonial powers presented. The Japanese had seen how China was carved up for the 
West’s for own economic benefit. They also remembered how helpless they were to 
Commodore Matthew Perry’s demands when he visited Edo Bay in 1853. 
 A profound sense of nationalism motivated the men who helped to bring down the 
Tokugowa Shogunate in 1867 and revive the emperor. They had been radicalized by the 
various events of the previous seventeen years, were angry at Japan’s position in the 




who desired to establish Japan’s place among the world’s powers in order to protect its 
independence and rights, or Itō Hirabumi who often voiced the desire to make Japan the 
equal of any Western nation. These overlapping motives became the basis and driving 
force behind a series of missions both at home and abroad designed to bring Japan up to 
par with the rest of the world and that fueled the progress of the Meiji Restoration. 
 Yamagata Aritomo had been a leader in the sōnnō jōi movement in the 1850s and 
helped to form a volunteer militia that had drawn from all of Japan’s social classes.
44
 
That regiment, called the Kiheitai, had been successful in both the Shimonoseki War 
(1863-1864) and in the Boshin Civil War in 1866.
45
 From these experiences Yamagata 
made a strong case for Japan creating a Western style conscript army. In 1869 and 1870 
he visited Europe and observed both the French and Prussian armies. His experiences 
with these modern conscript armies reinforced his leaning towards the formation of such 
a military in Japan. Yamagata’s observations on the benefits of the conscript army were 
essential to the development of his belief that Japan should adopt modern military 
practices and form a national army. The advantages of a conscript army that so appealed 
to Yamagata included: fast mobilization, complete support of the state by the population, 




 During the first year of the Meiji period both the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) 
and the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) were formally established. In terms of being 
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modern military services, though, both were still lacking. Yamagata spent an enormous 
amount of energy attempting to rectify this situation within the Army. Upon his return 
from Europe in 1870 he was appointed the Vice-Minister of Military Affairs. One of the 
first things that he did was to pass the Conscription Ordinance. This law was similar to 
French conscription legislation. It mandated compulsory service for all males twenty 
years of age. It was a tremendous step towards the disenfranchisement of the hereditary 
warrior classes. It also opened the door for social advancement based on skill and 
opportunity. More importantly it moved the people of Japan towards a more nationalistic 
fealty. 
 Yamagata’s trips to the West were some of the most influential of the series of 
foreign missions whose goal was to advance Japan. The Iwakura expedition potentially 
was the most important. It, more than anything else, shaped Japan’s future economically, 
socially, and politically. In 1871 Iwakura Tomomi led a group of forty-nine Japanese 
government leaders on an extended trip through the West. Fifty-eight students some of 
whom were tasked with remaining behind as international students for several years 
accompanied them. The group focused on learning about the West. Its primary objective 
was to learn the secrets of the West: How did the West arrive at the condition it was in 
presently? How could Japan reach modernity on an equivalent scale and place itself as an 
equal among the advanced nations of the West? The answers to those questions pointed 
Japan down a path that embraced technological progress and colonial conquest. They had 
keenly observed that not all Western countries were equally modern and those that were 
not, often fell victim to those that were. To that end the Japanese went about observing 




Once they had them, they studied them, understood them, and then improved upon them. 
It was not be long before Japan announced itself to the modern world. 
 The impetus for the diplomatic missions to the West was Japan’s changing ideas 
about its place in the Pacific and its relation to its regional neighbors. The Japanese, after 
witnessing how Europe had carved up China, had realized that they needed to advance as 
a nation technologically, socially, and economically. But, they were not sure what type of 
nation they were destined to become. The Iwakura mission more than any other defined 
what path that national change would take. The late nineteenth century saw an increase in 
the aggressiveness of Western imperial designs in the East. As the United States and the 
major powers of Europe had come to realize after several large-scale military conflicts, 
the strength of the national economy augmented the capability of a nation to achieve 
political unity in its populace and to exercise its military might. To that end, this period 
saw an increase in colonial empire building. The belief of the colonizing nations was that 
the possession of vast colonial territories contributed to the wealth and growth of the 
parent nation. As a result, Africa was quickly consumed by European powers. The US 
expanded into the Pacific and took Hawaii in 1893 and both the US and Europe then 
began to divide Asia. The US and Germany competed for influence in places like the 
Marshall Islands, France brought Vietnam under its umbrella, and Britain folded Burma 
into its empire. 
 The West’s belligerent encroachment into the territories of the East forced Japan 
to reassess its relations with both Eastern and Western nations. Yamagata Aritomo was 
once again at center stage. His ever-pragmatic worldview led him to see Japan’s 




Western colonial ambitions similar to the Eastern European nations he and others had 
observed. Korea, though, drew his attention more than any other nation. Korea’s location 
posed an immediate threat to Japan’s national security in his opinion. In Yamagata’s 
mind Japan needed to create a buffer around its possessions that was essential to 
maintaining its security. Korea, as a peninsula, protruded into Yamagata’s buffer zone. In 
order to defend the national interests and security of Japan, Yamagata introduced an 
ambitious plan for the rapid expansion of its military forces. His plan also included the 
development of corresponding intelligence services.
47
 
Japanese Intelligence Development (1868-1941) 
 The development of the various Japanese intelligence organizations coincided 
with its rise to imperial power. Early on, the Japanese realized that effective intelligence 
gathering was paramount to their planned success. 1868, the first year of the Meiji 
Restoration, marks the formal establishment of the Imperial Japanese Navy and the 
Imperial Japanese Army. From their beginnings each possessed and controlled its own 
intelligence apparatus. While the military technology of Europe was new and at times 
unknown to the Japanese, the art of intelligence gathering was not. For over a thousand 
years Japanese military leadership had followed the maxims contained in Sun Tzu’s The 
Art of War. One of the most poignant and perpetually relevant dicta of the text was that 
for one to be successful in battle, one must know his enemy as they knew himself. To that 
end the IJA had commenced intelligence gathering operations in China by the mid-1870s. 
Yamagata utilized information obtained from formal operations such as those performed 
by Fukushima Yasumasa and from informal operations performed by secret societies like 
the Genyosha. 
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  General Baron Fukushima Yasumasa (1852-1919) was a key figure in Japan’s 
early intelligence history. Fukushima was a native of Matsumoto in the Nagano 
Prefecture. One of his earliest assignments upon entering the Japanese army in 1878 was 
a posting as military attaché to the Japanese legation in China. It was during this time that 
he led one of Japan’s first intelligence rides, modeled after those of the great adventurers 
of the West, to India.
48
 In 1887 Yasumasa was posted as an attaché in Berlin. In 1892 he 
was recalled home and took fifteen months to cross Siberia alone. The route that 
Yasumasa followed took him over Siberia, Mongolia, and Manchuria. During his travels 
he kept detailed notes of everything that he was observing. The resulting reports served to 
feed the already growing anti-Russian sentiment that was forming in Japan. That anti-
Russian attitude amongst Japanese leadership was instigated by the Russian construction 
of the Trans-Siberian Railway. While the Russians made claims that the railway would 
serve an economic purpose, the Japanese saw it as an inroad for military advancement 
into the region. Fukushima “was probably the pioneer in Japan of the ‘intelligence ride’ 
already widely practiced by Russian and British officers in Asia.”
49
 Fukushima’s reports 
reached as high as Yamagata Aritomo. Fukushima’s reports no longer survive, but 
Yamagata’s own personal writings dating from October of 1893 acknowledge the weight 
Fukushima’s accounts carried in his strategic thinking.
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 Japanese intelligence has roots that can be traced all the way back to its feudal 
period. During that period much of the espionage was carried out by secret societies. This 
practice carried on all the way through the Second World War and many of those secret 
societies came to make up a significant portion of the informal intelligence network upon 
which men like Yamagata relied on. The Japanese recognized these societies as being a 
primitive, yet effective, means of sharing information, discovering secrets, and of gaining 
leverage on people. The Genyosha, Dark Ocean Society, was founded in 1881. The 
society gained enough power that it was actually able to influence Japanese politics. 
Genyosha was paramilitary in nature and it possessed a nationalistic objective. In the 
words of its members it existed to safeguard the rights of the people. Its real raison d’être 
was to gather intelligence on Korea, China, Russia, and Manchuria.
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Yamagata also received information that came from commercial espionage. The 
Nisshin Boeki Kenkyujo (Sino-Japanese Commercial Research Office) was one such 
example. Ostensibly, its employees engaged in learning Chinese customs, language, and 
culture in order to help Japanese companies doing business in China. Among the many 
tasks they engaged in was open source intelligence gathering. During the Sino-Japanese 
war the Japanese military utilized many of the employees of the Boeki Kenkyujo as scouts 
and interpreters. Additionally, the military used them to gather human intelligence. The 
Japanese military also began to use them to watch the Korean peninsula. They then 
expanded the scope of their operations in the 1890s to include observing Russia and its 
movements. The close eye kept on Asian neighbors was due in part to the fact that Japan 
now saw China and most of its Asian neighbors as backwards and itself as a great 
civilizing force for the region. Japanese leadership viewed both China and Korea as 
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puppets of Russia and therefore as hostile nations. Japanese leadership also viewed 
Russia’s movement and expansion into China and Manchuria as military endeavors and 
not commercial. One of the objects of Japan’s information gathering activities was to 
keep track of Russian political developments, troop numbers, and the disposition of both 
Chinese and Russian military forces. In many instances Japanese military officers on 
study leave with Russian units gathered intelligence on Russia’s military status. In the run 
up to the Russo-Japanese conflict the Japanese utilized this tactic extensively. The data 
collected by the formal and informal intelligence networks proved valuable in both of the 
conflicts Japan fought in at the turn of the twentieth century.
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 Since 1868, as a result of the many missions to Europe, including the Iwakura 
mission, Japanese military officers had learned about modern European military practices. 
On multiple occasions European military commanders tutored the Japanese directly in the 
techniques that were they currently employed. Prussian Major Jacob Meckel, for example, 
instructed his Japanese army counterparts on the army strategies utilized in the recent 
Franco-Prussian War. Japanese naval officers learned from their British peers while on 
study leave with Royal Navy units. At the same time British Royal Navy officers were 
posted on Imperial Japanese Navy ships and tutored their Eastern counterparts. While 
none of these lessons involved intelligence operations that we know of, that does not 
mean that the Japanese were not influenced by European examples of intelligence 
collection. There is ample evidence that even if the Japanese were not formally educated 
in European intelligence techniques, they were observant enough to learn from what was 
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going on around them wherever they were posted. The aforementioned intelligence rides 
of Fukushima Yasumasa stand as example of this. European expansion throughout Asia 
and Africa had established a tradition of intelligence gathering by lone military scouts 
and adventurers riding across frontiers. The reports they compiled fed not just the 
imagination of those back in their home country, but also supplied their native militaries 
with vital information on regions they may one day be invading.
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 Europe’s colonial expansion into Africa and Asia had created a practice of using 
spies and scouts to gather information on potential enemies. Military scouts often 
journeyed deep into frontier lands sending back detailed reports about geography, 
inhabitants, cities, and their thoughts on the cultures they encountered. Similarly, 
adventure journalists like Archibald Colquhoun and George Ernest Morrison undertook 
great expeditions across vast distances of foreign lands. Upon returning home, they wrote 
up their experiences for publication. While the public relished reading these exciting 
stories, often the true motive behind them was to help compile information for their 
government that aided them in conquering these exotic lands. The Japanese learned from 
the European example. They had their own adventurers, who like the European 
counterparts, secretly amassed information on their neighbors for the state. Japan, though, 
was not without its own rich history of espionage to pull from. The Japanese looked 
inward as much as they did outward in regards to spying and intelligence gathering. The 
Tokugawa Shogunate, for instance, had utilized sophisticated intelligence and spying 
operations in order to maintain control over the daimyo and samurai. 
 During the mid to late 19
th
 century the focal point of much of the Japanese 
intelligence gathering effort began to shift from military officers on study leave to the use 
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of attachés. The Japanese continued to employ and refine the practice of using attachés 
all the way up to the Second World War. Each attaché at an embassy collected and 
collated data into reports that were then sent to the associated First Secretary. The 
political attaché studied the political atmosphere, kept an ear to the ground at official 
functions, and read the local and national papers for political affairs of note. Similarly the 
commercial attaché kept abreast of the happenings in the business world. They made 
notes on new scientific developments, military contracts, and patents filed for new 
technologies. The commercial attaché also kept abreast of stock market activity and 
public financial matters. The military attachés spent their time, usually aided by a small 
team of specialists, combing through scientific and technical journals. They were looking 
for information on arms and ammunition production, advancements that had military 
applications, and even banking and shipping information that could reveal the production 
capability and capacity of the host nation’s industry. Thus, the embassy served as an 
intelligence clearing house. All the intelligence reports for a single region were gathered 
at this one place and then the First Secretary would send the information on to the 
appropriate ministry in Tokyo.
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During this time the Japanese also began to employ private citizens as intelligence 
assets. Japanese intelligence organizations paid private traders like Kishida Ginko to 
report back to their IJA handlers on a variety of subjects. Kishida had helped Dr. James 
Hepburn on his now famous Japanese dictionary. Together in 1866 they travelled to 
Shanghai to have it printed on the modern presses of that city. That first trip was the 
beginning of almost thirty years of traveling back and forth between China and Japan. 
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While in China, Kishida embarked on numerous business ventures. He became well 
versed in the customs and details of several regions. Kishida was a vast source of 
information on a country that few Japanese had visited. His final business venture was to 
begin publishing pocket editions of Chinese classics designed to be snuck into the 
Chinese Civil Service exam by hopeful candidates.
55
 Kishida also had ties with Genyosha, 
one of the informal intelligence networks utilized by the Japanese. It was one of his 
bookstores in Shanghai, spawned by the publishing of the pocket editions, which Lt. Arao 
Sei arranged to use as the base and cover for his formal intelligence mission in China. 
Arao pioneered the integration of the formal and informal intelligence networks that 
Japan used through the end of the Second World War. Arao utilized businessmen and 
combined their efforts with those individuals who conducted their own intelligence rides 
throughout Central Asia. He combined the use of informal intelligence sources with the 
formal military intelligence operations of Japan. In his efforts Arao managed to cover the 
military, political, and economic spheres of the region. In 1890 Arao, with the help of the 
IJA, established a formal government business in China. Located in Shanghai, the 
Nisshin Boueki Kenkyo-Jo’s (Institute for Sino-Japanese Trade) outward appearance was 
that of a legitimate business endeavor. The stated purpose was to educate Japanese 
citizens in the Chinese language and culture in order to facilitate Japanese commercial 
expansion into China. Meanwhile, its hidden purpose was the headquarters for Japanese 
intelligence operations in China.
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First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) 
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 The beginnings of Japan’s colonial empire came with the defeat of China in the 
First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). The war’s genesis had its roots in the continued 
concern of the Japanese over the danger the Korean peninsula presented should a foreign 
power gain a foothold there. Korea, unable to deal with Western encroachment, found 
itself with an isolationist government in the 1880s that was attempting to preserve the 
traditional conservative politics and society. The Koreans continued to rely on the 
Chinese for protection and guidance on international matters. Unfortunately, the Chinese 
were in no position to provide either. Having lost two wars to Britain in 1842 and 1860, 
followed by a loss to the French in 1885, the Chinese had proven they were incapable of 
resisting Western advances into the East. Finally, by the 1890s the Japanese leadership 
realized that possessing Korea would be beneficial for their growing industry as a result 
of the extensive coal and iron ore deposits it possessed. 
In 1894 hostilities broke out between Qing controlled China and Japan over the 
disposition of Korea. It was Japan’s first modern international conflict. It was not only 
the Japanese desire to end Chinese suzerainty there, but to also prevent any other powers 
such as the Russians, besides themselves, from taking up residence in the aftermath of 
accomplishing that goal. Almost as important was the fact that Japanese leadership had 
also recognized the economic potential that Korea held. It was rich in both coal and iron 
ore deposits, both important in the halcyon days of Japan’s industrial and military buildup. 




Traditionally, Korea had been a tributary of the Qing Empire in China. As a not 
unexpected result the Chinese regime held significant influence over the Korean officials. 
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While the Korean court remained conservative and subservient to the Chinese, the 
populace of the country was divided. On one hand there were those who wanted to retain 
the relationship with China and on the other were the reformists who wanted to break 
from this relationship. In large part the reformists were inspired by the accomplishments 
of the Japanese and saw the potential for their own country. As a result Korean reformists 
wished to approach Japan and the Western nations it had learned from in order to start 
their own journey of advancement. The Japanese were open to meeting with and 
promoting the agenda of the reformists for very obvious self-serving reasons. In the mid-
1880s China was weakened after fighting multiple wars against both the British and the 
French and the Japanese saw the opening to supplant Chinese authority in Korea. 
 Between 1882 and the onset of the war between Japan and China there were a 
number of crisis that resulted in escalated tension between the two nations. In 1882 there 
was a military uprising. Rioting occurred in Seoul. Food shortages that had occurred due 
to drought and that had led to great hardship among the Korean population triggered the 
violence. In the midst of the Koreans attacked the Japanese legation. Japan responded by 
sending a number of warships and a detachment of soldiers to Seoul in order to protect its 
interests. Tensions between the two subsided after an agreement that mandated Korea pay 
reparations to Japan. In 1884 there was a failed coup by a group of pro-Japanese 
reformers. While they were successful for a time in gaining power, it was not long before 
pro-Chinese forces took back the reins in a counter-coup. During the upheaval a number 
of Japanese citizens were killed. The result was the Convention of Tientsin which 




warning should be given to the other in the event the decision was made to dispatch 
troops for any reason. This became a key component in the start of the war in 1894.
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 In 1894 the situation in Korea became tense. Korean agents assassinated a pro-
Japanese Korean revolutionary, Kim Ok-kyun, who had been involved in an attempted 
coup in 1884. The Korean government had Kim’s body drawn and quartered and then 
subsequently displayed as a warning to other revolutionaries. This upset both the 
Japanese and the local Korean Kim supporters. At the same time the Korean government 
was also dealing with a populist uprising whose adherents demanded reforms aimed at 
improving the quality of life for Korea’s destitute. Unable to deal with these matters the 
Korean leadership turned to China for military aide. In June the Korean king asked for 
help in suppressing the Donghak rebellion. The Qing government responded by sending 
troops to aid the Koreans without notifying the Japanese. This caused considerable 
apprehension in Tokyo because the Qing government’s actions were in clear violation of 




 The violation of the previous Tianjin Treaty, which forbade the deployment of 
Chinese forces into the Korean peninsula without first notifying Japan, had the leadership 
in Tokyo clamoring for action. The Japanese feared Western interference on the Korean 
peninsula because of a weak Korean government that was allied to an ailing China. The 
solution was to propose that the Koreans accept Japanese protection and abandon China. 
In return, the Japanese would intervene in the current domestic crisis. This was to be 
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followed by longer-term intervention with an agenda of progress and reform in the 
country. The goal was to make Korea so strong that it would become a suitable barricade 
that prevented encroachment into Yamagata’s buffer zone. Japan dispatched an 
expeditionary force in late spring of 1894 with these, and other, goals in mind. In early 
July the Japanese captured the king and replaced the existing Korean government with a 
pro-Japanese body. The new body gave the Japanese the right to expel the Qing forces by 
any means necessary. Things began to deteriorate quickly after this. Soon after the British 
intervened but all their efforts to mediate a resolution failed. Within a short period the 
Japanese took all the necessary steps to expel the Chinese culminating in the first battle 





Prior to the onset of the war estimates of the Chinese military’s strength and 
capabilities had placed it well beyond those of its Japanese counterparts. It was not long 
before the intelligence apparatus of the IJA allayed any fears that were had concerning 
the Chinese military. General Fukushima Yasumasa, the Japanese attaché assigned to 
China, utilized the web of formal and informal intelligence systems to report that the 
Chinese Army suffered from both political and military weaknesses and that the 
symptoms were widespread. Yamagata, who was now a Field Marshall, learned from the 
intelligence system that significant levels of corruption plagued the Chinese Army. The 
vast intelligence network also illustrated that the figures on the strength of the Chinese 
Army were meaningless. Like the pre-Meiji conscript army the Chinese army drew 
officers and men from their commander’s home province. Any reinforcements or 
replacements also had to come from the same locale and could not be pulled from 
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anywhere else. This led to significant issues in training and bred infighting and favoritism. 
The loyalty of the various units was also in question.  
Corruption was also widespread. While a battalion should have consisted of five 
hundred men, Japanese intelligence discovered that many contained as few as three 
hundred, or sixty percent of their designed strength. This meant that the Chines army’s 
numbers were conflated. This was because many of the commanders kept the enlistment 
artificially low so that they could pocket the difference in the pay allotted to a full 
battalion by the government. The IJN also participated in pre-war intelligence work. It 
obtained valuable information by using private citizens as intelligence assets. Japanese 
Admiral Saigo Tsugumichi paid British national J.M. James to report on the daily 
activities in the city of Tientsin. Overall, IJN and IJA intelligence efforts elevated the 
Japanese confidence going into the conflict about what they could potentially accomplish. 
Their intelligence activities not only dispelled any notions of Chinese military superiority, 
it had also affirmed that their tactical analysis and planning were accurate.
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 The war lasted a scant nine months. Yamagata’s arms buildup in combination 
with the information provided by Japan’s intelligence network in China had given Japan 
a significant advantage. The lessons learned from the Europeans paid off. The Japanese 
forces overwhelmed the Chinese at Pyongyang followed by a decisive naval victory the 
day after. In November Port Arthur was taken and then in February of 1895 the Chinese 
fleet at Weiheiwei was destroyed. By April of 1895 Itō Hirobumi had negotiated an end 
to hostilities. The Treaty of Shimonoseki granted Japan territory in Manchuria to the 
Liaodong Peninsula, cession of the Pescadores Islands and Taiwan to Japan, and 
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numerous commercial and economic privileges. The concessions granted in the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki at the conclusion of the First Sino-Japanese War ushered Japan into the 
world as the first true Eastern colonial power. The Japanese had no intention of stopping. 
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) 
 In many ways the war between Russia and Japan had been inevitable. For over 
two hundred years the Russians had crawled across Asia until in the 1860s they reached 
the Pacific. Vladivostok, Russia’s newest port at the time, allowed the Russian Navy 
access to the Pacific, but its various egresses were well covered by Japan. In addition to 
the hindrance presented by Japan, Vladivostok was not an ice free port which was 
something the Russians desired. When Russia failed to gain possession of the island of 
Tsushima in 1860 as a possible place for a port in the Far East it turned its focus to the 
Korean peninsula. A port on the peninsula would allow the Russian fleet to sortie directly 
into the Yellow Sea.
62
 
In 1895 Russia had approached and been received by China as an ally against 
Japan. The payoff was that Russia had been allowed to construct the Chinese Eastern 
Railway across Manchuria. Shortly thereafter, in 1898, China ceded Shantung to the 
Germans as recompense for the murder of two of its subjects. Russia capitalized on the 
events and secured a lease of the Liaotung Peninsula from China at the same time. The 
Japanese sent a military force in to recover their legations and immediately withdrew half 
of their force upon the legation’s safe return. Russia again exploited the situation by 
sending its garrisons into Manchuria. The Japanese realized that it was only a matter of 
time before Russian attempted to push into Korea in order to utilize its warm water ports. 
The Japanese had considerable interests in Korea as they owned the Korean rail system 
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and tens of thousands of Japanese nationals had settled in Korea. Japan was able to force 
Russia’s withdraw through political maneuvering and with the help of its American and 
British allies. 
 In 1902 the Japanese and British signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which 
opened the door for Japan to consider military rebuffs of Russian advances into Asia. 
While British aid was not automatic in the event of conflict, the alliance formally 
recognized that the Japanese had political, commercial, and industrial interests in Korea. 
Additionally, the Americans had vowed to side with Japan if a European power should 
come to the aid of Russia in the event that hostilities broke out between the Russians and 
the Japanese. For a time it appeared that the overwhelming political pressure applied by 
the Japanese and their allies was going to carry the day. Unfortunately, it was not to be.
63
 
 Japan and its allies forced Russia to agree to withdraw its forces from Manchuria 
in three phases. In early 1903 the first of those withdrawals occurred. However, the 
second planned step of the withdrawal did not occur as planned. The Tsar ignored the 
moderates that were his advisers and instead created a Viceroy of the Russian Far East to 
whom he gave the ability to negotiate direct with Japan, China, and Korea. In doing this 
he completely cut his foreign minister out of the loop. The Tsar made Admiral Eugene 
Alexeiev the Viceroy. Alexeiev was an extremist in Asian matters and believed that 
Russian domination of the Asian people was necessary. Furthermore, for Alexeiev and 
those that shared his thinking Korea must be Russian.
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 In mid-1903, amid mounting concern, the Japanese proposed a settlement with 
Russians. The plan offered guaranteed both China’s and Korea’s territorial integrity, 
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recognize Russian railway interests in Manchuria, and Japan’s economic and political 
investments in Korea. Russia responded by saying it would only guarantee the Korean 
stipulations only. This alluded to the fact that Russian had designs on the whole, or at 
least a significant portion, of Manchuria. Additionally, Russia requested in its counter 
proposal that Japan should eschew fortifying the Korean coast and repudiate interest in 
Manchuria. Russia’s rejection of the Japanese terms made war appear inevitable. The 
British intervened, acting as mediator, but failed in the attempt. The Japanese re-iterated 
their terms in January 1904, but this time they came in the form of an ultimatum.
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 The turn of the twentieth century saw nationalism run rampant across the entire 
globe. It was also the high tide mark of European racism towards Asia peoples. German 
Emperor Wilhelm II often corresponded with his cousin Tsar Nicolas II applauding him 
for his stance against the encroaching Asian threat. Wilhelm saw Nicolas as the defender 
of not just Europe, but of white Europeans as well. With Wilhelm aggressively 
supporting Russian aspirations in the East it was only a matter of time before Russian 
intransigence lead to war. It was not long before the Tsar, as well as many Russians, 
became uninterested in compromise with the Japanese. The Japanese soon realized as the 
talks progressed at the end of 1903 Russia’s stubborn refusal to compromise was a 
stalling tactic. The goal was to give the Russian military time to build up before war. The 
Japanese, believing that the Russians could not be serious about war, offered one final 
ultimatum in January of 1904. The Tsar, emboldened by Wilhelm II’s rhetoric and the 
belief that Germany would come to Russia’s aid, ignored it.  
 The Tsar communicated in February of 1904 to his Viceroy that the Japanese 
should be perceived as having started any conflict. The Japanese did not bother to declare 
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war formally. On the 8
th
 of February Japanese destroyers attacked the Russian naval 
squadron at Port Arthur. On the 9
th
 Admiral Togo Heihachiro’s battleships entered into 
action forcing the squadron to withdraw into Port Royal. The formal declaration of war 
arrived on February 10
th
 1904, but the series of one sided naval defeats Russia suffered in 
the few days before the declaration were a foreshadowing of what was to come.
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 Japan’s strategy for the conflict was to destroy Russia’s navy. By accomplishing 
this goal the Japanese would be able to deploy their ground forces freely wherever they 
wished, and whenever they liked. The Russians intended to fight a delaying action, 
drawing the Japanese deep into Manchuria where they would be confronted far from 
resources and re-enforcements. There the Japanese would be defeated at either Harbin or 
Liaoyang. Within the first three months of the war the Japanese army had landed in 
Korea and advanced across the Yalu. Once they were into Manchuria they faced and 
defeated the Russians in battle twice. The second Japanese victory was the costly but 
tactically significant capture of Port Royal. The Japanese victory at Port Royal freed the 
forces there for important operations at Mukden. Japanese Field-Marshall Oyama Iwao 
(1842-1916), the Supreme Japanese Commander in Manchuria, acting quickly gathered 
about 250,000 men and began the assault. The Japanese faced approximately 320,000 
Russian over a fifty-mile front, but after three weeks of hard fighting and heavy losses on 
both sides the Japanese took Mukden. The victory at Mukden was the proverbial nail in 
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 Hoping that her sea power would save the day, Russia refused to surrender. In the 
hopes of possibly blockading Japan, the Russian Baltic Fleet sortied on the 16
th
 of 
October 1904. Japanese Admiral Togo correctly anticipated that the Russian Fleet would 
attempt to pass through the Tsushima strait as a shortcut to Vladivostok. Togo’s scouts 
sighted the Russian fleet at 5 am on May 27
th
. Admiral Togo departed with the Combined 
Fleet at 6:34 am and sighted the Russian fleet at 13:40. Within an hour Togo had 
executed the difficult tactic of ‘Crossing the T’ not once, but twice.
68
 By 9:30 on the 28
th
 
of May the Russian Baltic Fleet had been destroyed and what little remained surrendered. 
The Japanese losses amounted to around 600 casualties. Three torpedo boats sank. The 
Russians suffered far, worse losing seven of their total eleven battleships along with 
fifteen other ships constituting cruisers, destroyers, and miscellaneous ships in the fleet. 
Out of 18,000 Russian sailors only 6,000 survived the battle. The Japanese victory at the 
Battle of Tsushima Strait not only sealed the fate of the Russian navy, but of Russia itself. 
 In September of 1905, American President Theodore Roosevelt helped to 
negotiate peace between the two combatants. On the 5
th
 of September the Treaty of 
Potsdam was signed in New Hampshire. All Japan’s interests in Korea were formally 
recognized and both countries withdrew from Manchuria simultaneously. Furthermore, 
Japan received the Liaotung peninsula, the Russian rail system in the region, and received 
Russia’s mining rights as well. Both sides agreed to not exploit the Manchurian railways 
for strategic purposes and all of Manchuria was to be returned to China with the 
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exception of any leased territories. Maybe just as important as the concessions Japan got 
from Russia was the boost to its standing in the world. Overnight the Japanese Navy went 
from an unknown to being rated in the top three navies in the world. Just as important 
was the fact that the West now believed that Japan’s armies were nothing to be scoffed at. 
They drew interesting conclusions. The Japanese had fought with and defeated an 
opponent that had a numerical advantage but was also thought to be superior in both 
training and breeding. The world was on notice, Japan had arrived. 
Japanese Intelligence and the Russo-Japanese War 
 The Iwakura mission, along with the other diplomatic expeditions of the late 
nineteenth century, was more than just an information gathering endeavor. The Japanese 
also gathered intelligence on their potential European opponents. Germany, Britain, and 
British India were of particular interest. But none held the Japanese attention as closely as 
Russia did. From about 1890 forward the Japanese envisioned the Russians as the 
primary opponent of the Japanese military. Japan not only kept close tabs on Russia itself, 
but also upon the proceedings that it took part in Asia. Russia was known to be active in 
China, Manchuria, Korea, and Siberia. In fact the Japanese viewed both China and Korea 
as puppet states that the Russians influenced and regarded them as being hostile to 
Japanese interests. As a result, they received the same level of scrutiny that Russia proper 
did. By the time of the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese intelligence apparatus was 
much larger, more efficient, and no longer of an ad-hoc nature like it had been for the 
earlier Sino-Japanese conflict. The result was that intelligence efforts for the Russo-




now extensively developed Japanese intelligence during the waning years of the 
nineteenth century was the Trans-Siberian Railway and Russia involvement with it.
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 The Trans-Siberian Railway was constructed under the direct supervision of the 
Russian government between the years of 1891 and 1916. The intention was, officially, to 
create an efficient and speedy transportation route between Europe and Asia. Despite the 
large amount of commercial traffic the line serviced, being filled to capacity almost 
immediately, the Japanese leadership saw the line instead as a potential military artery. 
Japanese leadership viewed the line, in combination with the Chinese Eastern Railway, as 
a way for Russia to intrude on Japan’s regional concerns.
70
 It even potentially placed the 
Russians in the position to invade the Japanese Islands themselves. Thus, the focus of 
Japanese intelligence was to monitor developments along and surrounding the line. The 
construction and use of the Trans-Siberian Railroad became part of the casus belli for the 
Russo-Japanese War. In the mind of Yamagata, the railroad was a long-term threat. It 
gave the Russians access to Korea and its warm water harbors. The Russians, Yamagata 
concluded, would be tempted to obtain access and use those ports anyway they could. 
Ultimately, with Russians on the Korean peninsula the very of safety of Japan was at 
stake. Therefore, Yamagata and the Japanese decision makers were highly interested in 
the ability of the line to transport troops and military supplies from Europe to the East.
71
 
 During the period after the First Sino-Japanese War and going into the Russo-
Japanese War, the Japanese intelligence system used military attachés agents of 
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espionage. Prior to that and starting with the Meiji Restoration the practice of sending 
military officers abroad for training had become routine. Referred to as ryugakusei, 
overseas student, some of the first of these military officers arrived in Russia in the late 
1890s. Often, connected with the attaché office were groups of language officers whose 
duties also included acting as intelligence officers. The activities of the military attachés 
may or may not have been fully known to the diplomats who were also expected to carry 
out intelligence functions themselves. Even the lower level consuls, as was illustrated 
earlier with the story of Yoshikawa Takeo, provided reports inter alia on the military 
goings on in the city of their posting. By the 1890s Japanese intelligence operations 
exhibited the features that would make them successful during the first years of World 
War II. Diplomats, for instance, created spy networks out of local recruits who were paid 
from diplomatic funds. Intelligence gathering had long term goals in mind. Prior to the 
Battle of Malaya the Japanese utilized both of these techniques.
72
 
General Baron Fukushima Yasumasa was one of the early intelligence figures 
with a foreign posting who figured greatly in the future conflict with Russia. First posted 
to China in 1878 as a military attaché, he helped to pioneer the Japanese intelligence ride 
when he took a solo trip into India. In 1892 he spent 15 months on another such trip 
crossing Siberia. His reports on the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the 
organization of the Russian Army, and the apparent weakness of the Qing government all 
carried immense weight with Yamagata Aritomo. It was primarily because of these 
reports and the suspicion they cast on Russian intentions in the East that Yamagata 
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successfully argued for the buildup of the Japanese army and navy that occurred over the 
next decade. 
 In 1898 both the Japanese army and navy sent their own respective officers to 
Russia as ryugakusei. Hirose Takeo (1868-1904), a graduate of Tokyo Naval College, 
was posted under the naval attaché to the Japanese legation in St. Petersburg. He served 
in that position for five years. Meanwhile, Captain Tanaka Giichi (1864-1929), a 
graduate of the military academy, was assigned to the military attaché to the Japanese 
legation in St. Petersburg. Tanaka was instructed to pay particular attention to the 
condition of the Russian army, its operations, ability to mobilize, education, and the 
general condition of Russia. Both men were to pay close attention to the interconnection 
between the military and the people. The Japanese goal was to have both Hirose and 
Tanaka attached directly to Russian units during their time in the country. The posting of 
two Japanese officers to active Russian units had never been achieved before. Both men 




 In March of 1900 Captain Tanaka Giichi requested posting to a Russian unit. 
Tanaka’s Russian language skills had become more than adequate and he had gone so far 
as to profess belief in the Orthodox faith.
74
 In June of that same year his request was 
approved. During his time with the Russian unit, Tanaka carefully recorded the details of 
his time in the barracks and on maneuvers. More importantly he observed the social 
unrest that was present in Russia. Because of strikes organized by the revolutionary 
movement, Tanaka detected the beginning deterioration of Russian stability. He also 
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noted the movement for Polish independence in his work. Both things he believed could 
be exploited to the advantage of the Japanese in the event of war. To those ends he set 
about attending functions in Warsaw and building up connections amongst these various 
movements. He was careful, though, not stir up sedition.
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 In 1902 Tanaka was recalled to Japan. His superiors ordered him to persist for a 
time in both Manchuria and Siberia on his return for intelligence purposes. He left St. 
Petersburg in April and travelled to Harbin via the Siberian railway first and then the 
Chinese Eastern Railway. From Harbin he made an excursion by river to Vladivostok and 
then returned. He proceeded to take the Chinese Eastern railway again to Port Arthur 
whence he departed for Nagasaki. Upon his arrival in Tokyo of June of that same year 
Tanaka had completed over two months of reconnaissance throughout Russia. The 
evidence that Tanaka provided on the railways’ capacity to carry troops and supplies, its 
developmental progress, and Russian motives within the regions visited proved vital to 
Japanese strategic planning against Russia. As a result of his time and experiences in 
Russia he was promoted to head of the Russian section in 1903 and became responsible 
for operational planning against Russia. The intelligence gathering that Japan engaged in 
was not uncommon in the West or the East, as can be seen in this example. Intelligence 
excursions like this continued to play an important role through the Second World War. 
The Japanese often debriefed diplomats, heads of state, businessmen, and average 
citizens upon their return to the nation. The Japanese clearly developed an intelligence 
apparatus along the same lines and at roughly the same pace as their Western 
counterparts. 
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 Aside from information gathering, Japan also attempted to foment rebellion prior 
to and during the war with Russia. The Finnish and Polish populations were both 
susceptible to such efforts, as were weak points in Russia itself. Both had suffered 
persecution at the hands of the Tsarist government and both were sick of its perceived 
tyranny. In Finland, for example, a group of individuals who applauded Japan’s progress 
socially and economically opposed Tsarist rule. They saw in Japan a potential ally in 
escaping Tsarist tyranny. In 1904 they created a stir when they assassinated a provincial 
governor. The Japanese viewed them as a tool with which they could subvert the Tsar. In 
doing this they forced the Russian military to commit troops to a pacification effort. 
Those directly involved with the assassination were chiefly urban in nature. The Japanese 
military saw the benefit in exploiting resentment of the Russians and the potential 
undermining of their war effort. In Poland could be found the foundations of the labor 
movement and other anti-Tsarist groups which spread throughout Russia in the late 
nineteenth century challenging Tsarist rule. Individuals like Józef Pilsudski who resented 
the russification of their homeland held a deep seated distaste for not only the Tsar but for 
the Russian rule of Poland in general. These parties were all weapons against the 
Russians in the eyes of the Japanese. They were used to disrupt the Russian war effort 
and, in theory, were supposed to tie up the crack units of the Russian military.
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 Colonel Akashi Motojiro (1864-1919), Tanaka’s successor, became aware of the 
dissent present in both these regions. With the goal of finding a way to cajole Russia into 
keeping her top troops in Europe, Akashi set about aiding Russian revolutionaries, buying 
Russian agents, and disrupting Russian war efforts through the support of internal discord. 
Japanese intelligence not only used Finland and Poland, Pilsudski traveled to Tokyo at 
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the onset of the Russo-Japanese War to try to acquire Japanese assistance for a Polish 
uprising, to try and disrupt the Russian war effort, but it also attempted to use other anti-
Tsarist groups found along the Russian borders and in Europe. Akashi ended up 
distributing approximately one million yen to these various groups in attempting to 
complete his mission of subversion.
77
 
 While the Japanese subversion campaign during the Russo-Japanese war appears 
to have been enormous, the question of its effectiveness remains. While it is true that the 
Russians did not send their crack troops to face Japan at the onset of hostilities, the 
question of whether the decision was a result of unpreparedness, the surprise and 
swiftness of the Japanese attack, or Russia’s – and the West’s – propensity to 
underestimate the East’s abilities still remains. No direct correlation between Japanese 
activities and Russian troop deployment exists. In no way, though, does this detract from 
the efforts and achievements of Japanese intelligence. It was also during this time that the 
Japanese began intercepting communications between the Chinese diplomats in Japan 
and their government. While the Japanese had been able to crack Chinese cryptology 
there is no surviving evidence that they had been able to crack European codes. On the 




 As it is with all assessments of intelligence work, it is almost impossible to arrive 
at an overarching estimate of Japanese intelligence effectiveness during the war. The 
Japanese had both successes and failures. Japan was successful in obtaining actionable 
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intelligence through capable field officers. It was able to create concern about both Polish 
and Finnish resistance in Russian authorities. When Japan openly declared war, it created 
a general headquarters for intelligence gathering that lasted the duration of the conflict. 
As a result, Japan was able to offset for its lack of manpower and resources with the 
careful application of intelligence. In the end, the decision to go to war with Russia was a 
calculated risk based on information gained through its intelligence operations. Despite 
all of this and the resounding Japanese victory that made the Western world take note, 
several operational weaknesses were exposed that would feature down the road all the 
way to the Second World War. 
 For starters, Japanese cryptanalytic activities demonstrated their second-rate 
nature to their European counterparts. This problem would persist through their defeat at 
the end of 1945. For many, the Japanese had numerous small or short-lived triumphs, but 
never achieve the type of long-term successes that the West continually appeared to 
have.
79
 Another major weakness that became apparent during the Russo-Japanese War 
was the lack of co-operation between the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial 
Japanese Navy. Each ran their own intelligence arm and each acted, for the most part, 
independently of the other. Very little documentation survives on the IJN side, but what 
little there is seems to corroborate this. The relationship between the two continued to be 
strained all the way down to defeat in 1945. The other large pitfall of Japanese 
intelligence appears to be that it became dependent on personalized intelligence gathering 
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coming from almost larger than life characters like Tanaka and Akashi. This view may be 
a result of the lack of information left after the great purges of the Second World War.
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Almost no information exists on the level of organization in Tokyo during this time, or 
after, and what has survived tends to be of a biographical nature. This has led historians 




 What Japanese intelligence activities during this period reveal to historians is that 
they were not on a course of development dissimilar to their European counterparts. This 
was due in no large part to their extensive missions to the West where they interacted 
with, learned from, and observed the practices of European powers. While the Japanese 
may have lacked in certain areas they were just as accomplished as their Western 
counterparts in many of the other facets of intelligence gathering. The Japanese utilized 
the same Intelligence Cycle and the same collection disciplines as the West. It also 
reveals that the intelligence rivalry among services prevented the long-term creation of a 
governing central intelligence authority. This is something that the Western powers also 
suffered from. America itself did not attempt to solve this issue until the creation of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at the onset of the Cold War, and arguably still has not 
fully achieved the intended result. 
Outcomes 
Its military victories over first China and then Russia in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries respectively, signaled it arrival as a top world military power. 
These events helped to start Japan down the path to colonial expansion.  
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By the start of the First World War Japan had gained Taiwan in the Treaty of 
Shiminoseki, which ended the First Sino-Japanese War, and Korea as a protectorate, first 
through the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1905 and then fully annexing it in 1910. Japan seized 
upon the opportunity to expand its sphere of influence following the outbreak of WWI. 
The Empire of Japan declared war on the German Empire and quickly seized the German 
colonial holdings in the Pacific. Japan’s new territories were the Marshall Islands, the 
Northern Mariana Islands, and the Caroline Islands. The Treaty of Versailles officially 
recognized the Japanese seizure of these islands and the Japanese created the position of 
Governor of the South Pacific Mandate to oversee them. 
The islands of the South Pacific Mandate were of vital strategic import because 
they enabled the Japanese to dominate the Pacific sea-lanes militarily. Additionally, they 
provided advantages in terms of their positioning for the refueling and provisioning of 
ships. The Japanese viewed these islands as, in modern terminology, unsinkable aircraft 
carriers.
82
 The Japanese built them up militarily and used them first for their initial 
conquests of the Pacific starting in 1931 and ultimately to defend against incursion by the 
United States. The Japanese officially started the Pacific War with their invasion of 
Manchuria in 1931 following the Mukden Incident, otherwise known as the Manchurian 
Incident. The islands of the South Pacific Mandate became the sites for the both the 
offensive and defensive operations of the Japanese Navy and Army in the Pacific after 
the December 1941 offensive thrust into the Pacific. 
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Most importantly Japanese military intelligence had shown that it was equivalent in 
almost all respects to that of its Western counterparts. Japanese intelligence systems had 
played important roles in both Japanese victories at the turn of the twentieth century. A 
thorough analysis of Japanese intelligence has a basis in the late nineteenth century when 
they were absorbing, implementing, and improving on the practices they had observed 
while studying in the West. Japan’s intelligence methods were connected to the training 
of its military officers abroad. This meant that Japan’s military branches were developing 
their intelligence capabilities at roughly the same time as their Western counterparts. In 
1893 the Navy General Staff took over operational authority of the IJN and its third 
department, or section depending on translation, was dedicated to intelligence gathering. 
The Imperial Japanese Army, under Yamagata Aritomo, fully adopted the Prussian 
General Staff system in 1878. Under this organization the second department, or section, 
was dedicated to intelligence operations. For comparison, the Office of Naval 
Intelligence (ONI) is the oldest existing intelligence service in the United States founded 
in 1882. Likewise, the US Army counterpart, the Military Intelligence Division (MID), 
was founded in 1885. Meanwhile Britain’s Secret Service Bureau, the predecessor to MI6, 
was formed in 1909 and the British Royal Navy formed the Naval Intelligence 







British Malaya is the term used to describe the states of the Malaya peninsula that 
Britain brought under its colonial umbrella in the late eighteenth century. The Malayan 
peninsula lies on a vital sea-lane for trade and travel. The first Europeans to establish 
themselves in the region were the Portuguese in the sixteenth century, followed by the 
Dutch in the seventeenth century. English traders had been present in the Malayan region 
since the seventeenth century. Prior to the nineteenth century, the British interests in the 
region had been of an economic nature. Having already colonized India, they began to 
look for new territories to strengthen their colonial empire in terms of raw resources. As 
time progressed, the British were able to establish a series of free ports in the region in an 
attempt to break up the monopoly held on the region by other European powers. 
Eventually, these ports allowed Britain to control the majority of the trade through the 
region. In the nineteenth century, fearing Siamese expansion, the rulers of Malaya 
aligned themselves with Britain thereby increasing its power in the region. 
It was the British that eventually established their sovereignty over the Malayan states 
with the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824. That treaty delineated the boundaries between the 
Dutch East Indies and the territories that became British Malaya.
83
 Becoming a British 
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Colony introduced the Malayan region to yet another round of foreign influence as the 
British imported Indian workers and eventually Indian soldiers into the region in order to 
meet the demands of the colonial economy and defend the colony. 
 While British policy was decidedly non-interventionist to start with, the mining of 
resources valuable to the Empire led to infighting among the Malay states. Initially, this 
conflict revolved around the production of tin. The resulting destabilization led to British 
intervention. The British employed gunboat diplomacy to pacify the region and bring it 
back into line with the Empire. In 1874 the British and the Sultan of Perak signed the 
Treaty of Pangkor. The treaty opened the door for increased British influence and 
legitimized their presence in the region. As a result, the British placed advisors with the 
Malay states and eventually ruled in all but name. 
 British fully established rule by the early twentieth century. The populations of 
the region, now known as British Malaya, were subjects of the crown. As with other 
colonies, the British viewed Malaya as primarily an economic possession. Initially, its 
main attractions were its tin and gold mines. Eventually, British entrepreneurs 
experimented with a variety of cash crops that included coffee and pepper. In the late 
nineteenth century, rubber was added to the list of valuable exports and with the rapid 
growth of technology it soon became the leading earner for the region. By the 1930s, 
some fifty years after the introduction of rubber, the international trade that ran through 
Malaya and Singapore was significant. 
 1926 was the peak year for British Malaya in terms of trade. Malaya by itself 
eclipsed all other British colonies combined in terms of value. It decreased after that due 




Yet, in 1938 Malayan trade still eclipsed that of all the British African colonies, or of 
New Zealand.  By that time Malaya was producing half of the world’s rubber, one third 
of its tin, and it had substantial iron ore deposits. It is no wonder that Japan looked at 
Malaya with intent. Not only did it harbor vital resources that Japan needed for its own 
economic and military advancement, it also provided a gateway to the Dutch East Indies 
and their bountiful oil fields. Then there was Singapore, a thriving port lying on a 
valuable trade and travel route. Malaya was rich with raw materials that Japan needed to 
feed its war machine and economy. It was inevitable that the Japanese would look to take 
these colonies from the British and other European powers for its own.
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Pre-World War II Malaya 
 Japan had begun the process of organizing an espionage ring in Malaya during the 
First World War. During that conflict Britain granted Japan, then an ally, the use of naval 
facilities in the port of Penang. At that point in it its history Japanese intelligence services 
possessed nearly twenty years of successful operations experience. Utilizing Japanese 
agents and foreign assets, the intelligence agencies proved instrumental in the decision to 
go to war with China, the First Sino-Japanese War, and later in the Japanese victory over 
Russia during the Russo-Japanese War. It was not long before they put the skills and 
tactics they had honed in the previous quarter century to work in Malaya. By 1905 the 
Japanese had operatives in the northern and Southern regions of the China Seas. Once the 
Japanese established a covert presence in Malaya it was a relatively easy task for them to 
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link up with their sister networks in places like Thailand and Burma. This led to the 
creation of a loose, but large, web of intelligence that spread across the entire region.
85
 
Starting in the 1870s and continuing through the late 1930s the Japanese 
population on the Malayan peninsula increased from a mere handful of individuals to 
over six thousand people. During this period the nature and makeup of this population 
had evolved considerably. The population evolved from a predominantly female base to 
male and professionally from prostitution to entrepreneurial in nature. The period 
between the two world wars saw some of the most explosive growth in the Japanese 
population and these changes were the reflection of the growing Japanese Imperial drive. 
The need for more raw materials, outlets for manufactured goods, and territory led to 
emigration and economic enterprise throughout the region. Japanese ambition in East 
Asia was driven in part by the desire to be viewed as an equal of its Western counterparts. 
This drove the Japanese to exert a greater effort to achieve their goals.
86
 
 In the late 1930s the British became increasingly alarmed about the number and 
activities of the Japanese nationals living in its Southeast Asian possessions. A significant 
portion of the British authorities’ attention focused on actions classified within the 
category of espionage. The British anxiety was not unfounded. There was an extensive 
pre-war espionage network in Malaya controlled primarily by the Japanese. They did 
have some fringe help from their future allies Italy and Germany. Regrettably, the 
majority of the Japanese populace’s actions that were of interest to the British in these 
cases have failed to receive much, if any, scholarly attention. The narrative on the 
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security of Malaya and the Singapore naval base is incomplete until this aspect is added 
to the other facets currently being studied. The information that we do have about 
Japanese assets placed at the community level and within the commercial environment 




The inter-war period is notable for being a time during which a lack of attention 
and funding compromised the British Far East strategy. Despite an analysis by Major-
General William Dobbie that predicted when and where major landings could, and would, 
occur in the event of an invasion, the British government took no remedial action. In lieu 
of sending a large number of reinforcements to the region the British decided that a 
proper defense was possible by using a large naval force stationed at the Singapore Naval 
Base. By 1940 military planners grudgingly admitted that to defend Singapore alone the 
British needed more than just a strong fleet presence. They also needed a significant air 
force, numbering upwards of 500 aircraft, and ground forces in addition to the naval units 
in order to secure the entire peninsula. Unfortunately for the British it was a matter of too 
little too late. By the time they realized their folly, priorities in other regions of the world 
and at home prevented them from sending the required forces for a successful defense of 
Malaya. 
The oral histories and memoirs from British expatriates and Malayan nationals 
during the inter-war period recount a lively Japanese citizenry that was involved in all 
aspects of life. In almost every town, village, and community there resided a Japanese 
population that was participating in a variety of trades. Local Japanese populations 
engaged in trades like barbers, shopkeepers, photographers, and fishermen. As tensions 
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between East and West increased, the seemingly omnipresent Japanese soon evolved into 
the ever present and ever watching Japanese spy, for both their contemporaries and later 
historians. Despite being over exaggerated there was a significant element of truth 
underlying these suspicions. The Japanese intelligence organizations were financially 
backing much of the subversion that existed in Malaya and it was not confined to just 
those individuals of Japanese heritage. It also included Indians and Malayans who were 
unhappy with British colonial rule. British authorities, sensitive to potential diplomatic 
backlash from a nation that was still nominally friendly and desiring to avoid creating 
unrest in the East, resorted to deporting only those Japanese suspected of espionage who 
they had enough information on to warrant such action.
88
 
The British were in a pickle. Despite the mounting evidence that pointed to a 
complex and massive espionage campaign in Malaya they were still very careful not to 
take any action that may have provoked or offended the Japanese. The British had 
enough on their plate in the West, the last thing they wanted to do was precipitate 
violence in the East. This was further complicated by the fact that through the mid-1930s 
up to 1940 the Japanese government was going out of its way to look for provocation, 
especially in the diplomatic realm. Adding to the strain for the British was the growing 
concern over developments in Europe. British leadership was well aware that they could 
ill afford a war on two fronts. Europe was the, closer, more pressing concern. This 
resulted in a non-confrontational policy in the East. They still needed to find some way to 
curtail Japanese intelligence activities. Thus, the British resorted to deportation in cases 
involving the Japanese that warranted action. Even in those instances the decision to act 
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needed sanctioned first by the Foreign Office and then by the Colonial Office, both 
located in London. As can be expected this led to inter-ministry headaches for the British 
and an exploitable weakness for the Japanese.
89
 
Commercial and Diplomatic Intelligence 
The Japanese web of espionage in Malaya focused more heavily on the collection 
of commercial intelligence. In the pre-war period the majority of the agents that 
comprised this web were individuals of a Japanese nationality, many of whom were 
ostensibly there on commercial business. Most of these people were what the Intelligence 
Community today refers to as an asset. The Japanese government did not directly employ 
them per se, instead they were tasked with collecting intelligence that they came into 
contact with through the course of their normal business dealings and day to day life. 
This is not to say that there were not a considerable number of agents whose spying was 
the main reason that they were there. As assets of the Japanese intelligence apparatus, 
they only took part in the collections step of the Intelligence Cycle. They were not privy 
to, nor did they need to be, the larger planning and direction of operations. This was as 
much for their own safety as it was for the security of whatever operation they were 
providing data for. In today’s parlance this is referred to as compartmentalization.
90
 
Thanks to Japanese imperial ambition, not only had the Japanese presence 
multiplied in regards to population in Malaya, but also in respect to the number of 
commercial endeavors that they had. They owned tin mines in the east and in the south in 
and around Johore, rubber estates along major routes of travel that allowed them to 
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monitor Commonwealth troop movements, and a massive fishing fleet that operated out 
of Singapore and travelled up and down the entire coast. During their fishing voyages the 
skippers of the individual vessels had ample opportunities to survey various ports, the 
coastline, and traffic on the seas. A favorite tactic of the Japanese intelligence 
organizations was the infiltration of the small business professional, and the result is the 
ubiquitous image of the dentist who was a spy that has been passed down to us by history. 
In practically every town there was a Japanese storekeeper, barber, or dentist. In many 
instances they set up their practices and businesses near, or even next to, the local British 
garrison. This made it easy to monitor activity and in the course of doing business pick 
up the random bits of information that were spilled through uncaring lips.
91
 
In a situation not that much different than today, the vast majority of Japanese 
enterprises that were located throughout the rest of the world, not just Malaya, were 
engaged in some kind of espionage.
92
 Many of the businesses were not only members of 
government sponsored trade organizations but had also received substantial funds or 
subsidization from the Japanese government. In many instances the entire reason for the 
existence of a firm was to conduct intelligence gathering for the government and partake 
in subversive activities. This was multiplied by the devotion that Japanese citizens had 
for their land and emperor. The fidelity of Japanese nationals to their home was strong 
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enough of a motivating factor that both employees of corporations and regular Japanese 
citizens would engage in espionage without question when called upon. 
Two prime examples of firms whose raison d’être was spying were the Nippon 
Trade Agency and the South Manchurian Railway (SMR). The “Nippon Trade Agency, 
which was almost certainly a section of the Army Special Service Section,” had branches 
all over the world that included cities and countries such as Singapore, Bangkok, and 
China.
93
 In China it was even known as the ‘Japanese Detective Bureau’.  The SMR 
eventually gave “birth to the Economic Research and Investigation Bureau.”
94
 The SMR 
also had close ties with the Japanese Army in Manchuria and actively engaged in 
espionage on its own. Several SMR’s officials, when detained and searched in Singapore, 
were found to be holding detailed documents on the rail systems of several neighboring 
countries. Among the nations they had information on were Thailand and the Netherlands 
East Indies (NEI). NEI possessed rich oil deposits and as a result was of particular 
interest to the Japanese. These documents included a confidential book, of which there 




Colonel Tsugunori Kadomatsu’s story is one good example of the ability of 
Japanese agents to insert themselves into positions of opportunity in Malaya. Tsugunori 
had been working for Japanese Naval Intelligence since 1930. Employed under the alias 
Shawan, he worked in Singapore for approximately six years as a steward in the British 
Officers’ Club. Owing to lax security within the club, Tsugunori passed on information 
about the daily routines of crews, issues within the fleet, along with the comings, goings, 
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and potential destinations of the various British and commonwealth ships stationed or 
visiting Singapore. The British discovered Tsugunori in 1941 when a visitor noticed his 
unusual interest in the officers’ discussions. The British devised a rather simple ruse to 
catch the spy. The next time that he was working an officer would mention, in a 
noticeable manner, that the warship Prince of Wales was due in port soon. Meanwhile 
another British agent would observe the actions of the, hopefully, unsuspecting 
Tsugunori. When the scene played out the British agents observed Tsugunori hastily 
scribbling something on a napkin that he was holding. Once detained and the napkin 
confiscated it read ‘PW end of November’ and the British promptly arrested him.
96
 
Diplomatic intelligence was, and still is, an incredibly efficient and effective way 
of gaining information about one’s opponent. The Japanese used their embassies and 
consulates more extensively for covert affairs than most other countries at the time did. 
As had been the practice for almost seventy years, Japanese consulates and embassies 
directed intelligence activities within to which they were accredited. They actively 
executed the collection, processing and exploitation, and analysis steps of the intelligence 
cycle. In some cases, to varying degrees, they also partook in the planning and direction 
step. Staff, whose primary mission was the gathering of intelligence, filled these locations. 
Ambassadors, consular officials, and attachés collected information on any matter that 
could be of use or was of interest to their or other departments. From their official offices, 
they managed the covert operations of the various Japanese associations and commercial 
firms. They also facilitated the meetings between subversives and nationalists with their 
own government officials. They took advantage of their diplomatic privileges, as many 
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nations still do today, in the organization and facilitation of these operations. They even 
functioned as clearing houses for all of the intelligence that was collected, passing it 
along in protected diplomatic pouches or transmitting it direct to Tokyo via their own 
wireless systems. Once the intelligence arrived at the appropriate department in Tokyo, it 
was analyzed and the final product was disseminated to the proper parties for use. 
The Shinozaki Case 
One of the more famous cases of pre-war diplomatic espionage was that of 
Shinozaki Mamoru (1908-1991). The declassification of British records in the years after 
the war combined with the release of an autobiography in the early 1970s now permit a 
deeper analysis of the events surrounding this man. In the fall of 1940 Shinozaki was a 
press attaché stationed in Singapore at the Japanese Consulate-General. His position as a 
journalist, a non-official cover or NOC, provided the cover for his activities as a spy for 
the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
97
 In September of 1940 Shinozaki was arrested 
on charges of espionage after obtaining intelligence of a military nature from a British 
serviceman. 
As had been practice since the early days of the Meiji Restoration, Japan had been 
sending consuls to Singapore since the late 1880s. British authorities had come to suspect, 
and rightly so, that the staff of these consuls were engaged in activities beyond the scope 
of the normal consular duties, activities of a clandestine nature. British suspicions were 
compounded by their inability to distinguish clearly between Japanese government 
employees and those who employed by Japanese-run organizations. The matter was 
complicated owing to the fact that many Japanese firms were part of government funded 
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trade organizations or had received substantial government financial backing. Shinozaki, 
though, had carried a letter of appointment expressly naming him as a member of the 
consulate staff when he arrived in 1938.
98
 
Special Branch of the British colonial police in Malaya had long deemed the 
Japanese Consulate-General in Singapore as the primary conduit through which 
intelligence flowed to Tokyo. While this was not, nor is it still, an unusual practice, it did 
present the British with a very specific and delicate set of problems. First and foremost, 
the Japanese and British, ostensibly, were friendly. Any action the British took to curb 
and counter the intelligence activities of the Japanese had to be carefully calculated for 
political reasons. Second, once any information had been placed inside of a diplomatic 
bag and properly marked the British had little recourse for search or seizure even if they 
had enough evidence to do so. If the intelligence did not go out via diplomatic courier 
then operatives smuggled it out aboard ships, by agents across the border to Thailand, or 
radioed to passing sea traffic. The suspicions of the Special Branch proved to be very 
astute after the start of the war in December of 1941.
99
 
Upon his arrival in Singapore Shinozaki began to fraternize with British service 
members who posted there, often times inviting them out to raucous parties. It was these 
parties, in combination with his posting at the consulate, which caught the attention of the 
British Special Branch. It was not long before Shinozaki’s movements were being 
watched with regularity. After agents of Special Branch observed him meeting multiple 
times with Frank Gardner, the British service member in question, they ordered 
Shinozaki to report to Special Branch headquarters. Gardner was detained at a later time 
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for questioning. Prior to his being called in by the British Special Branch, British agents 
observed Shinozaki meeting with visiting mid-level Japanese Army officers and escorting 
them around Singapore. These interactions only served to confirm Special Branch’s 
suspicions about him. The British arrested Shinozaki promptly upon his arrival at Special 
Branch headquarters. 
Special branch detectives took Shinozaki to the Consulate-General in order to 
search his room. The Consular-General Toyoda Kaoru who had been proclaiming 
Shinozaki’s innocence also accompanied them. When they arrived Shinozaki bolted for 
his residence. Upon entering his quarters he attempted to dispose of a letter by throwing it 
quickly to the Consular-General’s secretary. While the detectives searched the room 
another consular official attempted to burn and flush another document down the toilet. 
In total, the British recovered the first letter, several reports, a notepad, and the partially 
burned document. Toyoda remained present during the entire search in an attempt to 
prevent the British from opening and searching the official consular safe. 
After a short trial Shinozaki was found guilty of collecting information on and 
about the Royal Artillery and for collecting information on the movements and 
deployments of British troops, both for “… a purpose prejudicial to the interests of the 
British Empire ….”
100
 During the trial it came to light that Shinozaki had paid Gardner 
undisclosed sums of money. The conclusion was that those payments had been for 
information detailing British military troop movements and disposition. Shinozaki denied 
that he had ever had conversations with any British service members on such topics other 
than what came up in passing. He claimed he had never deliberately sought the 
information out. He also contended that the money he had given to Gardner had been 
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merely “out of sympathy.”
101
 The question had been, and to some extent still is, what 
exactly did Shinozaki do and was he successful in any attempts he made to gather 
information on British forces.
102
 
In post-war interviews, Shinozaki reversed his post-trial stance. He admitted to 
attempting contact with British Royal Artillery servicemen. His goal had been to 
ascertain the positions of the heavy British guns. Authorities in Singapore at the time of 
his arrest had also determined that he had attempted to learn from Gardner information 
regarding British troop movements, positions, coastal defenses, unit strengths, and the 
location of ammunition dumps. While his success at gaining this information appears to 
have been mediocre, his acting as a guide for Japanese military experts was significant. In 
September of 1940 Shinozaki guided Army General Staff planning officer Lieutenant 
Tanigawa Kazuo and his assistant Kunitake Teruhito around the Southern portion of the 
Malayan peninsula. Their observations were included in a report published in 1941 titled 
“Intelligence Report of British Malaya” and included detailed cartographic information 
on the region stretching from the Malay peninsula all the way to Singapore. Kunitake 
later became a staff officer in the 25
th
 Army. That unit successfully attacked the very 
areas Shinozaki had guided him to for surveillance.
103
 
Despite British efforts to keep things quiet when dealing with Japanese agents, a 
few cases like the Shinozaki case did become public. Those that did served only to re-
enforce the fears of the populace that Japanese spies could be lurking anywhere. British 
authorities attempted to counter the Japanese intelligence activities but lacked any real 
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counter-intelligence strategy. They began to prohibit foreigners or “aliens” from certain 
areas and to declare others off limits to foreigners. The police created a special Nippon 
(Japan) section that dealt exclusively with the comings, goings, and activities of Japanese 
nationals. Despite British counter intelligence efforts, diplomatic concerns prevented 
their endeavors from being effective. More importantly, the cases that are known about 
are direct evidence that the Japanese were continuing to use attachés, businessmen, local 
shop owners, and even the disenfranchised native populace as operatives to great effect. 
They are proof that the Japanese continued to operate a highly developed espionage 
operation that consisted of both formal and informal collections activities. They had 
employed these same tactics with great effect since before the First Sino-Japanese War 
and they were some of the same strategies that the West was employing. The result of 




Japanese Naval Intelligence 
 While we have spoken about diplomatic and commercial intelligence, let us turn 
to the subject of naval intelligence. The Japanese created the The Kaigun Tokumu Bu, 
Naval Special Service Organization, in the early 1930s in China. Its origination lies with 
a group of naval attachés located at various ports. The Naval Special Service 
Organization performed many of the same functions of its army counterpart and was 
supposed to cooperate with them closely. However, the Naval Special Services never 
achieved the power or importance of its army equivalent and there is evidence that the 
navy units engaged in infighting and petty disputes with the army units. There are even 
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 Possibly some of the most significant work that the Kaigun Tokumu did was in the 
South China Sea around Malaya. The intelligence effort undertaken by the navy agents 
aboard Japanese fishing vessels helped to map coastlines, conduct hydrographic surveys, 
reported on naval traffic, and scout naval bases and ports. The Japanese fishing fleets 
were by far the largest in the region and they roamed far and wide collecting intelligence. 
The issue became so severe, and so widely known, around Singapore and the coasts of 
Malaya that the government decided to limit the annual number of fishing licenses the 
Japanese could have. They also instituted a system of inspection to help combat the 
issues on those vessels that were granted a license. While the issues surrounding Malaya 
and Singapore are perhaps the best known, it is highly likely that the Japanese navy 
repeated the use of this tactic in other areas as well.
106
 
 Like other land based commercial interests, the fishing fleets of Japan were often 
highly subsidized by the government, if not directly then most assuredly through bank 
loans that were guaranteed by the government. Many of the officers in the fishing fleets 
were naval officers. Their actions often gave them away to British Special Branch. Often 
times they became exceedingly obdurate when the British boarded their vessel. In one 
instance, the crew of the largest fishing vessel to visit Singapore, the Shinkyo Maru, acted 
in such a professional manner that Special Branch suspected the entire crew of being, at 
the very least, naval reservists and the ship of being a spy ship. Furthermore, the British 
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discovered that the vessel itself carried both a medium-wave and short-wave transmitter. 
The latter of which had a range of almost ten thousand miles under the ideal atmospheric 
conditions enabling the Japanese to communicate with Tokyo directly. Special Branch 




 The Inspector General of Police, Straits Settlements, René Onraet (1887-1952) 
recounted in his 1947 memoirs that evidence, like that found on the Shinkyo Maru, of 
Japanese intelligence efforts was rarely uncovered by the British. Yet, his post-war 
assessment was that this did not matter because the British never developed an effective 
counter-intelligence program to combat them. He referred to their fishermen as “’South 
Seas Ronin’” and described their operations as a “’Standing Patrol’” that extended all the 
way back to Japan.
108
 The success of the Japanese invasion of Malaya in 1941, along 
with other landings in the Southeast Asia region, are proof evident of the effective 
gathering of intelligence by the Japanese Naval Special Services. The knowledge that 
was provided on landing sites, coastlines, and littoral hydrography collected by the 
fishing fleets played an important role in the early Japanese triumphs in the Pacific.
109
 
Japanese Army Intelligence Efforts in Malaya and Southeast Asia 
 Finally, we shall address the topic of Japanese Army Intelligence. In the 1920s the 
Japanese Army established the Tokumu Kikan (Special Service Organization) which 
operated initially in Mongolia, Manchuria, and China. The initial area of operations was 
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due in no small part to the experiences and fears the Japanese had harbored about these 
regions since the turn of the twentieth century. Tensions grew geo-politically in both the 
East and West, the Special Service Organization began to open up branches in French 
Indo-China, Malaya, and Thailand. Many of the kikans operated covertly under assumed 
names, while others were derived their name from their leader like the famous F Kikan, 




 Despite the fact that the kikans fell under the authority of the Army General Staff 
in Tokyo they had a great deal of autonomy. The General Staff granted the kikans a good 
deal of independence, but they also assumed a good deal of it on their own. The character 
of the kikan’s commander often determined the level of independence for unit. The most 
obvious examples of this self-determination occurred in Manchuria where kikans often 
conducted operations without any authorization from Tokyo and in some cases explicitly 
against orders from the General Staff. 
 In general, the kikans fell within the categories of strategic or tactical operations 
depending upon the mission they were created for, or assigned to. As a result, some of 
them were permanent fixtures in a region or theater while other existed only for a short 
period before being dissolved upon the completion, or failure, of their mission. The 
kikans that operated within a military unit tended to be semi-permanent and their mission 
of a strategic nature. On the other hand, the IJA created temporary kikans for short-term 
tactical goals and they often operated in forward areas with very specific short term 
objectives. In both cases all clandestine operations, espionage, subversion, and fifth 
column activities fell under their purview, the exception being outright military 
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intelligence missions. The kikans also acted as a liaison between the Japanese 
government and local government officials and/or, depending on the situation, the leaders 
of various insurgent and independence groups in the local population. 
In mid-1940, the Japanese ramped up the effort to gather intelligence on Malaya 
and the surrounding regions. It was during this time that the Imperial Japanese Army 
intensified the deployment of its own assets into the region. During these preliminary 
efforts matters involving the Soviet Union and China pre-occupied the Japanese military. 
It was within this setting that Shinozaki played his part and began the gathering of 
intelligence prior to the Battle of Malaya. In early 1941, the strategic and logistical 
planning for the Malayan offensive began in earnest but by then Shinozaki was 
imprisoned. However, the role played by Shinozaki and others like him illustrate that the 
Japanese had started gathering information early. The nature of the information Shinozaki 




The Japanese Military Affairs Bureau Unit 82 conducted military planning for the 
coming offensive. Unit 82 utilized intelligence developed from the web of agents that had 
been cultivated since the end of the First World War. Subsequent to the attack, the Army 
General Staff assigned intelligence officers like Fujiwara Iwaichi to lead the clandestine 
intelligence divisions within the region. As previously mentioned one of the primary 
functions of the kikans, was to establish connections with subversive elements and pro-
independence factions, and in Fujiwara’s case, it was to make contact with Malayan 
independence groups. Through the kikans these grassroots organizations gained financial 
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support for their cause in return for providing the Japanese with information on 
Commonwealth troop strength, disposition, and movement. The kikans were 
accomplishing two objectives at once, stirring up anti-British sentiment while obtaining 
valuable military intelligence. Fujiwara Iwaichi headed one of these intelligence 
operations called Fujiwara Kikan after its leader, F Kikan. Established in 1941, and sent 
to Bangkok in September of that same year, the General Staff tasked F Kikan with 
contacting the various anti-colonial factions and movements in the region. It achieved 
notable success in establishing cooperation between the leaders of several of these 
movements and Japan. In February of 1941, British intelligence picked up some of the 
aforementioned radio transmissions from these sources. The messages contained 
deployment information for Commonwealth forces and their equipment. Additionally, 
many of the disaffected Malayans Fujiwara’s unit supported helped to create maps of the 
jungles, terrain, and act as guides for the Japanese when they invaded. The information 
provided by these spies contributed to the successful invasion in December of 1941.
112
 
Japanese intelligence activities in the Southern Region illustrate how Japan’s intelligence 
development was proceeding along similar lines, and a similar pace, as the West. It is 
clear that they understood the intelligence cycle. Unit 82 and other intelligence 
departments provided planning and direction for assets in the field. The kikans executed 
the collection step for the IJA utilizing the OSINT and HUMINT disciplines. The IJA 
also engaged many of its informal intelligence networks to achieve its goals. Analysis 
and evaluation was conducted in multiple locations. Initially the primary distillation of 
the raw data was performed within the units themselves. Then their analysts would create 
an intelligence product and disseminate it to the proper departments in Tokyo. All of 
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these components contributed to the success the Japanese would achieve when they 
invaded Malaya. Prior to the invasion Japanese military leadership had an extensive 
knowledge of British Commonwealth forces disposition, capability and weaknesses. The 
Japanese engaged and supported native nationalist movement in order to undermine the 
British. Finally, due to Japan’s intelligence efforts the military planners had an excellent 
lay of the land. Japan’s intelligence system was clearly not the “…unsophisticated, 
parochial, fragmented, adamantine, spasmodic and often vague…” operation that many 
experts today claim it was.
113
                                                          
113
 Alvin Coox, “Japanese Net Assessment in the Era before Pearl Harbor,” in Alland Millett and 






The Battle of Malaya 
 The Battle of Malaya, often referred to as the Invasion of Malaya, began on 
December 8
th
 1941 and ended on January 31
st
 of 1942. The opening stages of the attack 
occurred just prior to the strike on Pearl Harbor. It was the first major battle of the Pacific 
War. From the onset the Japanese had naval and air supremacy. Fighting between the 
Imperial Japanese Army and British Commonwealth forces on land dominated the 
landscape. The campaign was total disaster for the defending forces as the IJA routed the 
British at every turn. One of the notable features of the battle was that the Imperial 
Japanese Army utilized bicycle infantry. This allowed the IJA to move swiftly through 
the jungles while still carrying a significant amount of equipment. Despite the fact that 
British Royal Engineers destroyed over a hundred bridges the IJA was not delayed. This 
was due in large part to the extensive intelligence operations that had been undertaken 
prior to the battle. The IJA had obtained excellent maps of the region and native guides 
that were waiting to lead the troops through the terrain. 
 The IJA 25
th
 Army invaded the northern coast of Malaya at Kota Bharu on 
December 8
th
 of 1941. The IJA also landed at two different places in Thailand and 
attacked West into Malaya. On the same day, Japanese air power began an assault on 
Singapore. The Japanese quickly isolated defending units of the Indian Army and forced 




swiftly across the country achieving its objectives. The Japanese use of light armor added 
to their advantage as the Commonwealth forces had no equivalent. Japanese airpower 
was not just superior in number, but also in the quality of aircraft and pilots. What 
airpower the British forces did have was quickly destroyed.  
The Commonwealth Forces suffered defeat followed by defeat. On December 8
th
 
they attempted to invade Thailand and destroy a key road but failed. On the 10
th
 of 
December Japanese aircraft sank the battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the 
battlecruiser HMS Repulse, becoming the first capital ships to be sunk solely by aircraft. 
What followed were a series of defeats at places like Jitra, Kampar, and Slim River. By 
the middle of January 1942, the IJA had reached Johore a southern Malayan state. Johore 
marked the first time the Japanese suffered a tactical setback due to the incredibly 
stubborn defense mounted by the Australian 8
th
 Division. The Australians were not able 
to hold their position for long and after being outflanked fought a withdrawal action that 
lasted for four days. On the 20
th
 of January the IJA landed more troops at Endau and the 
last Commonwealth defensive line in Johore was under assault for its entire length. With 
no fixed defenses to fight from it was only a matter of time before the line collapsed. On 
the 27
th
 General Archibald Wavell gave permission for the remaining forces to fall back 
to Singapore. 
 In just under two months’ time, the IJA had handed the British Commonwealth a 
stunning and one-sided defeat. Over 50,000 Commonwealth troops were captured or 
killed. When the IJA took Singapore another 80,000 were taken prisoner. By the time it 
was all over the Japanese had suffered some 9,000 casualties. The Commonwealth forces’ 




lost two ships of the line, one of which was the newly completed battleship Prince of 
Wales.
114
 British airpower had been eliminated. The British presence in the Pacific had 
been all but removed along with any threat it may have posed Japanese ambitions. 
Fujiwara Iwaichi and F Kikan  
Since the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese had felt that their position in 
Manchuria was necessary for the defense of Korea and ultimately Japan itself. They also 
desired the economic gains the resources of the region provided. In the late 1920s 
Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek and the successful unification of China were 
threatening their position in Manchuria. Simultaneously Russia was beginning to exert 
pressure on the region. Within the Japanese government and military there were elements 
who concluded that a conflict was in Japan’s best interest because war provided a 
legitimate excuse to invade. The invasion would be the means by which Japan could 
fortify the area and solidify its control. The result was a false flag operation engineered 
by officers of the Kwantung Army now known as the Manchurian Incident. On the 18
th
 of 
September 1931, Kawamoto Suemori carefully placed explosives along a section of the 
South Manchuria Railway near Mukden. Just after 10 p.m. the charges were detonated. 
Kawamoto and his fellow Kwantung Army conspirators intended to derail the Darien 
Express and blame the local Chinese warlord. The Japanese used the apparent act of 
Chinese terrorism as a pretext to invade, as planned, and occupy Manchuria. The road to 
the Pacific War was open. 
The Second Sino-Japanese War technically started in July of 1937. The Marco 
Polo Bridge incident marks the moment when tensions between Chinese and Japanese 
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forces escalated into outright combat. Both the major Western powers in the region, 
Britain and America, condemned the Japanese as the aggressor in the region. As the Sino-
Japanese conflict deepened and consumed more the region, the Western powers began to 
take action against the Japanese. The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union 
all imposed economic sanctions on the Japanese in response to their activities. The 
situation in the Pacific intensified when Japan allied with Germany and Italy in July of 
1941. The Japanese invasion of French Indochina only served to exacerbate the situation. 
In response, President Roosevelt seized Japanese assets in America. Shortly thereafter, 
both the British and the Dutch followed America’s example. This effectively put Japan 
on the defensive as it relied heavily on the import of raw materials and oil to power its 
industry and war machine.
115
 
The Japanese began to plan for the impending military clash between themselves 
and the Western powers in the Pacific region. The Japanese army had prepared 
extensively to fight on the Asian mainland against both the Chinese and the Soviet Union. 
It had not trained or planned as extensively to face their potential Anglo-American 
adversaries in the vast regions of the Pacific. Facing a potentially vast and drawn out 
conflict in the Pacific Japanese leadership looked to places like Burma, the Dutch Indies, 
and Malaya to become important battlegrounds. In addition to being rich in resources, 
these colonies also possessed populations the Japanese could subvert to fight against their 
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The indigenous peoples of places like Malaya came to play an important role in 
the coming war. Despite the erosion of the national consciousness of colonial populations 
caused by years of imperial rule, they still yearned to be free. The Japanese realized that 
if they examined and learned what the desires and sentiments of these groups were, then 
when war came they would have the ability to assist them. Ostensibly, the efforts aimed 
at helping groups, like the Malayans, gain their independence. In return, they would view 
the Japanese as liberators and friends. More importantly, in assisting them the Japanese 
forced the colonial powers to have to deal with a subversive element that could erode 
their power from the inside. They would also be able to provide invaluable assistance and 
intelligence to the Japanese in the lead up to war and then during actual conflict itself. 
Realizing that Japan and the Western powers were on a collision course, the 
Imperial Japanese Army 8th section, Intelligence section, began to investigate the various 
courses of action they had available to them. Ultimately, they came up with three 
potential courses of action. The first was to pursue a relationship with the Indian 
Independence League (I.I.L.). The second was to collaborate with Malayan independence 
fighters led by native-born Japanese Tani Yutaka (1911-1942). Tani had immigrated to 
Malaya in the late Meiji period and had opened a barbershop. During an anti-Japanese 
incident, shortly after the Manchurian Incident, Tani’s six-year-old sister was killed 
during an episode of public violence. Afterwards, Tani joined a group of Malayan bandits 
and quickly became renowned for both his bold actions and fighting spirit. By the late 




almost three thousand men. It was not long before he was working as an agent for the 
Imperial Japanese Army Intelligence section.
117
 
In the fall of 1941 things were heating up fast for Japan. The Army General Staff 
was preparing for war of an unprecedented scale in the Pacific against the West. The 
Western powers had already employed a number of economic sanctions against the 
Japanese in an effort to curtail their activities. In September of 1941 Fujiwara Iwaichi 
reported to Army General Staff 8
th
 section officer Lieutenant Colonel Kadomatsu in 
Tokyo. Kadomatsu was sending Fujiwara to Bangkok in order to assist Colonel Tamura 
Hiroishi in the overseeing of a kosaku (intelligence operation) in Malaya. 
Fujiwara’s commanders dispatched him to the region because they believed that 
the situation in Malaya would soon degenerate to a state of war with Britain. Fujiwara’s 
was officially ordered to”… engage in a kosaku in Malaya in order to assist intelligence 
operations, particularly with respect to the I.I.L. [Indian Independence League] and 
Malay and Chinese anti-British groups.”
118
 Fujiwara’s mission encompassed assisting 
Japanese military operations, promoting a spirit of cooperation between the Japanese and 
Malaya’s disaffected population in the event of hostilities, and to assess the potential “… 
Japan-India relations from the standpoint of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere.”
119
 It was Fujiwara’s mission to collect intelligence on the Commonwealth forces, 
and to find a way to pit Indians and Malayans against their colonial overlords.
120
 
Since the early 1930s the Japanese had been observing the nationalists in Malaya. 
They began providing various independence seeking factions, like the I.I.L., with the 
                                                          
117
 Iwaichi Fujiwara, F. Kikan, 9; Ken Kotani, Japanese Intelligence in World War II, 53-54. 
118
 Iwaichi Fujiwara, F. Kikan, 17. 
119
 Iwaichi Fujiwara, F. Kikan, 17. 
120




funds necessary to pursue their endeavors. In Malaya the I.I.L. had and extensive network 
of agents and sleeper cells. One of which was responsible for a bout of unrest during a 
rubber workers strike in May of 1941. Unable to quell the uprising the estate owners had 
to call on the 1/13
th
 Frontier Force Regiment, made up of Indians, to deal with it. This 
played into the Japanese hands as “setting Indian against Indian in a foreign land” did 
little for either the morale of Commonwealth units or for popular support of the 
British.
121
 The greatest success of the I.I.L. ended up being found within the ranks of the 
Indian forces in Malaya. This was to be essential to the later Japanese success because 
“49 percent of the combined British/Indian/Australian/Malayan force” was Indian.
122
 
Fujiwara along with his men arrived on the 28
th
 of October in Bangkok. The 
Japanese took extraordinary security precautions to protect the men and their mission, 
including the use of false identities for the unit. Within a few days of his arrival, Fujiwara 
received his orders from Colonel Tamura Hiroishi. “Under my command I want you to 
take charge of liaison with the I.I.L. and to assist Tashiro, who is responsible for overseas 
Chinese affairs, and Kamimoto, who is in charge of the Harimau kosaku… .”
123
 As he 
was to be the liaison between the Japanese and the I.I.L. Fujiwara was introduced to 
Pritam Singh, a leader in the Indian Independence League. The I.I.L. had been attempting 
to bring as many Commonwealth soldiers of Indian heritage into their fold as possible 
and many of those men were stationed in Malaya. Fujiwara, in time, became the driving 
                                                          
121
 Peter Elphick, Far Eastern File, 192. 
122
 Peter Elphick, Far Eastern File, 192; 
122
 Iwaichi Fujiwara, F. Kikan, 12,13. 
123
 Iwaichi Fujiwara, F. Kikan, 22. Hiramau is the malay word for tiger and was the name that Tani Yutaka 








As the faceoff between the Japanese and the Western powers in the Pacific 
intensified, Japan found itself strapped for needed resources due to economic embargoes. 
Shortages of strategic resources, both at the time and foreseen in the future, like rice, tin, 
oil, and rubber forced Japan’s gaze to focus on the small countries of Southeast Asia. 
Malaya and Thailand could provide the needed tin and rubber. The Netherland East 
Indies could provide the oil required and possession of Malaya furnished the easiest path 
into that region. Thailand, like Korea, could become Japan’s rice bowl. In the midst of it 




Thailand’s position geographically in the heart of Southeast Asia made it crucial 
to both the West and Japan. The West could use Thailand to check Japanese military 
moves in the region. With the proper attention, the West could prevent the Japanese from 
acquiring the strategic resources that they so needed and desired in order to continue their 
quest for Pacific dominance. On the other hand, it was imperative that the Japanese 
establish a foothold in the country. From Thailand they could easily gather intelligence 
on the military situation in Malaya and in Burma. It gave them an easy point of 
infiltration into both these regions so they could support indigenous independence efforts 
and subvert British authority. Thailand, at the outbreak of hostilities, became an 
important piece of the puzzle in the victory over the British. 
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Over the previous ten years, the Japanese had managed to manipulate people and 
events in order to create a pro-Japanese faction within Thailand. Major-General Pibul 
Songkram (1897-1964) had seized power in a coup d’état in 1932. In 1938, amidst the 
rise of National Socialism, he consolidated his power and became the fascist leader of the 
nation. In 1940 he instigated an incident with French Indochina in order to recover 
territory lost to the French. The Japanese took notice and intervened as a mediator. By 
helping to settle the matter and in the process setting up new borders that were favorable 
to Thailand, the Japanese earned support from the Thai government. In return, the 
Japanese chose to support Pibul. These events combined with Japanese presence in the 
region gave it a louder voice when it came to Thai affairs. Colonel Tamura, whom 
Fujiwara had recently reported too in Bangkok, had effectively been the man shaping the 
political situation in Thailand. He was without a doubt the leading authority on Southeast 
Asian affairs within the region.
126
 
At the time of Fujiwara’s arrival in Bangkok the state of things had become much 
more complex and dangerous. The Western powers were desperately seeking any 
intelligence that could aide them in defending their holdings, China jockeyed with Japan 
for support in the region. Even Germany was eyeing the resources of the region for its 
own war effort. Japan’s counter intelligence effort was multi-faceted and involved both 
formal and informal operations. They utilized doctors, both civilian and military, 
operatives disguised as commercial representatives, military advisers to help with 
armaments sold to Thailand, technicians for the railroads, and even Buddhist monks. 
In a foreshadowing of things to come, the Japanese intelligence effort suffered 
from the kinds of activity that would plague Japan in the latter half of the coming war. 
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The lack of a central authority regarding intelligence matters meant that not everyone was 
being directed the same. The intelligence collected was sent to various departments, but 
often it was not shared as inter department competition was growing. The IJA and the IJN 
both operated their own intelligence unit independent of any central control and with 
practically no horizontal coordination. This meant that two seemingly innocuous pieces 
of data that when combined may have revealed something key to Japanese efforts 
potentially never crossed the same desk. Furthermore, the departmental and agency 
rivalry extended to the agents in the field. Often times Fujiwara observed, they worked 
just as hard to find out what the other Japanese were doing as they did trying to ascertain 
data on the enemy. This behavior often led to agents exposing not only themselves but 
also other operatives and assets of the Japanese government.
127
 
Fujiwara had his first meeting with one of the I.I.L. leaders, Pritam Singh, at the 
residence of Colonel Tamura sometime shortly after he arrived in Bangkok. Fujiwara had 
realized before he left Tokyo that the Japanese needed to pursue a policy in Southeast 
Asia that sought to understand the various populations’ desire for independence from 
Western colonial rule. Through assisting them in gaining their liberation Fujiwara not 
only served Japan’s purpose of creating a subversive force, but the Japanese could then 
fold that population under their own imperial umbrella afterwards. Fujiwara realized that 
the kosaku that he was assigned to needed to have a basis in understanding and utilizing 
ideologies that were compatible with the Malayan population.
128
 Fujiwara's first words to 
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Singh were “I have come to help you realize your high ideal [independence] and I look 
forward to working together with you.”
129
 
From the start, Singh and Fujiwara appeared as old comrades. Singh openly 
shared his political activities and the fact that he had been working for Indian 
independence since 1939. He felt betrayed by the British and looked to take advantage of 
the apparent coming hostilities in order to achieve his goals. A few days after meeting 
Fujiwara, Singh took him to meet a Japanese national named Otaguro who had been 
working as an English teacher in Singapore. While Otaguro did not appear to be 
interested in any kind of nationalist movement, he held no love for the West. It was 
because of the growing Anglo-Japanese tension that he had had to leave Singapore. 
Fujiwara made the man his eyes and ears in the city. 
Having begun to develop his own network of assets Fujiwara set about coming up 
with a system of operations in the region. He wanted to find out from Singh what the I.I.L. 
activities were in Thailand and Malaya. How did these coincide with the plans for his 
independence movement? Fujiwara needed to know how this could fit into Japan’s plans, 
how could it aide their efforts when war came. To make matters difficult, the entire time 
Fujiwara was planning for war, he had to be careful not let on to his new cohorts that 
Japan was preparing for war against the West. 
The importance of the relationship that Fujiwara had with Singh and the I.I.L. 
cannot be understated. Indians made up almost fifty percent of the British 
Commonwealth forces. The I.I.L. had members stationed in southern Thailand along the 
Malayan border and in Kota Bharu on the east coast of Malaya. Singh traveled to these 
locations on a monthly basis in order to maintain contact with his people and help to 
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distribute anti-colonial propaganda. The I.I.L. was actively trying to win the Indian 
soldiers over to its side. The I.I.L. had not been able to infiltrate the British-Indian Army 
units that guarded Malaya’s border because of frequent rotations. The Indians in those 
units, though, were known to have strong anti-British feelings and be receptive to 
propaganda. Singh assured Fujiwara that in the event of hostilities the Indian soldiers 




Despite the fact that the I.I.L.’s efforts had not been able to penetrate deep into 
Malaya, Fujiwara saw an opportunity. Fujiwara first wanted to use the I.I.L. to organize 
Indians within Malaya in order to help expand I.I.L. activities within the country. He also 
saw the chance to penetrate into enemy lines by giving Japanese Army support to I.I.L. 
agents. Through them, he hoped to win support among Indians in the Malayan civilian 
population and with those within the Commonwealth army units. The second goal was 
especially important for when hostilities commenced between the two nations. In order to 
help win hearts and minds Fujiwara guaranteed the lives of all Indian POWs. This would 
illustrate to the Indian POWs and those that remained in Commonwealth service what 
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By November relations between Japan and the West had grown stale to the point 
that Fujiwara knew that war was inevitable. He found it increasingly difficult to lay 
concrete plans for war and yet kept them hidden from his assets like Singh. Over the 
course of four meetings Fujiwara discussed the implementation of the plans he and Singh 
had made for the I.I.L. Included in those discussions was the admission that Malaya 
would become a battleground in the coming conflict. By the end of the sessions Singh 
and Fujiwara had not only come to common ground on ideology but also created a pledge 
of support to each other. Among the articles in the agreement were statements that 
affirmed the I.I.L.’s military support of Japan against Britain in the region, the I.I.L. 
would advance with Japanese troops into Malaya and a host of other nations in order to 
convert British-Indian troops to the Japanese cause. On the other side of the table the 
Japanese pledged to recognize the I.I.L.’s independent actions, guarantee the safety of all 
Indian POWs, the IJA would assist the I.I.L. in its propaganda efforts, and provide 






F Kikan, under Fujiwara’s leadership, played a significant role in opening up 
relations with the various independence movements in the region. These proved to be 
invaluable once the Japanese had invaded. They not only provided valuable military 
intelligence, but also the native Malayans involved drew maps of routes through the 
jungles and some even acted as guides when the invading Japanese landed. Perhaps the 
unit’s greatest accomplishment was a direct result of the contact Fujiwara had with 
independence leader Pritam Singh. Thanks to the relationship that was developed, 
Fujiwara was able to recruit approximately forty thousand Indian prisoners of war into 
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what became the Indian National Army (INA). This was a magnificent accomplishment 
and posed a very real and very direct threat to the British imperial rule. The INA took 
part in operations against the British in 1944 in Arakan and Manipur. At the end of the 
war many in the INA were held as complicit in Japanese war crimes and the repatriation 
of others resulted in their facing trials for treason. Many historians view these 
proceedings as the stimulus for several famous mutinies. They are considered crucial to 
the eventual ending of British rule. While the INA, directly or indirectly, seems to have 
been more effective in the post-war period, it without a doubt constituted a major military 
concern during the war and thus drew British resources and attention away from other 
matters. This in and of itself should be considered a success.
133
 
During the invasion of Malaya Japanese units utilized light tanks and, famously, 
bicycle infantry. However, the invaders had not actually brought their bikes with them. 
They knew from the intelligence gathered by native assets that they could confiscate what 
they needed from the local populace. More importantly, they were able to traverse the 
tropical rainforests that were interlaced with native paths thanks to the native guides they 
had, due in no small part to the efforts of Fujiwara and the F Kikan unit. Fujiwara’s 
activities illustrate the usefulness of organizing subversion and guerilla warfare efforts. 
Despite the military accomplishments of Fujiwara and his unit, its true success was one 
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“The Odd Man Out” – Patrick Stanley Vaughn Heenan 
 By the time the Japanese launched their offensive in the Pacific they had utilized 
their impressive HUMINT network to gather the information they required prior to the 
attacks. Japanese intelligence efforts steadily intensified as Japan gained both economic 
and military power in the Pacific. Beginning in the 1930s their clandestine efforts had 
increased to a point that they were drawing attention and raising concern with British 
authorities. Late 1940 and early 1941, at least eighteen months before their attacks, saw a 
significant increase in Japanese military intelligence assets deployed to places like 
Malaya and Thailand. Agents consisted of embassy staff, Japanese business people, 
tourists, and came to include disaffected members of the indigenous populations. The 
Japanese had done their due diligence and the reward was a series of sweeping victories 
that left the Americans reeling and all but removed the British from the theater for the 
rest of the war.
135
 
 Malaya, better than any other target, embodied the spirit and achievements of 
Japanese intelligence. The Japanese Secret Services, and the intelligence web that they 
had created, had successfully constructed a realistic picture of the British Order of Battle 
(OOB). That intelligence web, as previously illustrated, consisted of diplomatic, military, 
and commercial components. The Japanese had also enlisted the aid of the local 
populations and paid informants. Some of those informants had were even British 
servicemen as in the Shinozaki incident. Several British servicemen over the previous 
years had been bribed into providing the Japanese with information on troop and 
weapons deployment, layouts of bases, and even the whereabouts of vessels of the Royal 
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Navy. Perhaps, though, the most significant of all these accomplishments was the 
recruitment of Captain Patrick Stanley Vaughn Heenan (1910-1942).
136
 
 Patrick Stanley Vaughn Heenan was a complicated individual. While he appeared 
to athletically gifted, academically he was lacking. In 1935 he managed to be selected for 
service in the Indian Army but was a misfit from the onset. Many of those who served 
with him felt that he walked around with a chip on his shoulder for some reason. 
Unbeknownst to them, or the Indian Army, Heenan was illegitimate and this was one of 
the primary sources of his rancor. In his time with the Indian Army he was transferred 
numerous times. This only added to his feelings of being an outsider. Despite performing 
admirably during a campaign on the frontiers, he remained unpopular. Compounding the 
issue was the fact that essentially it appeared that he had no desire to remedy his status as 




Captain Heenan took a long leave in 1938. The exact dates of his leave are 
unknown to historians, but it began sometime in the fall and lasted into the spring of 1939. 
His decision to spend his time in Japan was not unusual for officers of the British and 
Commonwealth forces. In some cases the trip to Japan was merely a layover before 
returning to England, but for many the entire leave was spent there learning the language 
and immersing themselves in the culture and its customs. These extended leaves in Japan 
were not frowned upon. With the situation in the East degrading quickly war seemed 
inevitable and any and all knowledge of the people and language of a potential enemy 
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It is unknown whether Heenan sought out the Japanese or whether he was 
approached and recruited like so many other assets. Presently, it appears that any of the 
records on Heenan were destroyed at the end of the war along with so many others, and 
neither the Japanese Defense Agency nor the National Institute for Defense Studies has 
any information on him. There are also no files in any of the records that the United 
States confiscated with the Japan capitulation in 1945. 
Whatever the circumstances of his recruitment, it is apparent that during his time 
in Japan he received instruction on intelligence tradecraft. It is also during this period that 
he most likely learned how to operate the radio equipment he used as a spy. The Indian 
Army Signals School did not start giving instruction on radio sets until 1941 and there 
were few other places that he could have learned the necessary skills to use the 
equipment he in possession at the time of his capture. Additionally, he needed instruction 
in the codes that he was to use. The period when he learned the codes would have 
presented his Japanese handlers the most opportune time in which to teach him how to 
use the radio. Heenan’s new Japanese handlers also taught him the art of taking pictures 
suited for intelligence purposes. He later proved to have a talent for it. The Japanese 
handlers also educated him on the web of espionage they had created in Malaya. He 
would have been told who his contacts were too be, some of whom were in the I.I.L. The 
entire recruitment in all likelihood was rather routine, as the Japanese did not realize 
exactly who they had. Here, was a major failing on their part. Had they done their 
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research on Heenan, they may have been able to see how valuable he was, and foresee 
how much more valuable he could become. An officer like Heenan had access to 
valuable information like daily codes, troop strength, disposition, and the equipment and 
supplies available to them.
139
 
  Having been recruited by the Japanese intelligence services while he was on 
leave in Japan, Heenan returned to Malaya around July of 1939. Heenan was by all 
accounts an unpopular fellow and ill-suited for most of his duty postings. After his return 
from Japan he served with the 15
th
 Motor Transport Company, but after a short time he 
was in trouble for his attitude once again. Apparently, among all the skills that he had 
learned in Japan he had failed to learn how to control his temper. In September of 1939 
he became involved in a quarrel between the military police and the British Other Ranks 





was not the first, nor the last, transfer for Heenan. While with the 1/16
th
 Heenan 
distinguished himself during the Waziristan Campaign but this was not enough to change 
others’ opinions of him or to lose his mantle as misfit. As soon as was possible the unit’s 
new commanding officer, a Colonel Clarke who took command after the campaign, took 
the first available opportunity to make his unit’s problem, someone else’s.
141
 
In October of 1940, Heenan found himself as part of the 2/16
th
 Punjab Regiment 
that was being sent to Malaya. It is possible that Heenan requested a transfer to the unit 
so as to be in a better position to be useful to his Japanese handlers, but more likely he 
was assigned there in yet another instance of British commanders attempting to pass on a 
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problem officer. By late October the convoy that the regiment had boarded to travel 
Malaya was anchored off Penang and the regiment had disembarked for its new camp. 
The regiment’s new location put it very close to the Malay and Thailand border and it 
was at this point that Heenan’s handlers really began to put him to work. Patrick made 
numerous clandestine trips into Thailand and began passing intelligence.
142
 
 Due to being an unpopular fellow and apparently ill-suited for duty in his initial 
posting with the 2/16
th
 Punjab regiment Heenan’s commanding officer, Colonel Frank 
Moore, requested he be transferred out. One of the many reasons given for the transfer 
was his propensity for taking unauthorized trips into Thailand. While this behavior 
should have aroused some sort of suspicion, it did not. Furthermore, not only was Heenan 
transferred, he was going to be posted to a newly formed intelligence unit and was being 
made a Grade Three Intelligence staff officer. The promotion granted him a security 
clearance and access to secure facilities. The new posting was in Singapore and the 
position was as Air Intelligence Liaison Officer (AILO). This new position provided 
Patrick Heenan with extensive access to highly sensitive information that would be 
actionable in the eyes of his Japanese handlers. The Air Liaison Unit was involved in the 
planning of the ground and air defenses for the northern airfields and the port city of 
Penang. The AILO position also afforded Heenan with more freedom to move about, 
both on his own and as part of his duties, and he visited a number of airfields in both an 
official and unofficial capacity.
143
 
Heenan used his position to glean information where and when he could. Often he 
used his rank and its influence to turn unknowing officers into unwitting agents of the 
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Japanese. A warrant officer, whose last name was Swindlehurst, stationed at the Alor Star 
airfield was one such source for Heenan’s activities.
144
 Heenan regularly requested that 
Swindlehurst drive him about the airfield and give him a detailed account of the 
serviceability and availability of the aircraft on hand under the guise of collecting data for 
a report or briefing. As Heenan was the AILO, Swindlehurst was obliged to comply with 
his requests with no second thoughts. Flight Sergeant Ron Wardrop was another 
innocuous individual who became a source of intelligence for Heenan. Wardrop was 
Armourer Sergeant for 62 squadron stationed at Alor Star and Heenan frequently queried 
him as to the status of stores and request detailed explanations of their purposes. He also 
repeatedly inquired as to which aircraft could be armed with what weapons.
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During this time Heenan continued to engage in unsanctioned trips that doubled 
as photoreconnaissance missions. In fact, Heenan had grown evermore complacent in his 
tradecraft thanks to the lack of any real counter-intelligence efforts by the British. Many 
of his activities were beginning to draw suspicion from comrades but also from his 
Commanding Officer in the Liaison unit, Major James Cable France. France had 
discovered that his “…Photogenic Captain G III – Tom Heenan…” had taken a party of 
troops out on supposed exercises and while out had photographed all the roads, 
crossroads, and junctions. France later learned of Heenan’s similar trips into Thailand 
while stationed with the Punjabi regiment earlier. France also learned that Heenan had 
persuaded the Station Commander to allow him access to Frank’s highly secret 
documents stored in the Commander’s safe. The complacent attitude toward Heenan 
despite the mounting suspicions of his comrades and commanding officer are damning 
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evidence of the general British outlook on the Japanese. It was a viewpoint that was 
inspired by the fiction of Fortress Singapore and the racist belief that the cartoonish 
Japanese could not possibly pose a threat. But pose one they did and Heenan had become 
one of their most important tools in Malaya.
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Heenan’s position in the Air Liaison Section was nigh perfect for gathering the 
military intelligence Japan needed for its invasion. As an AILO, Heenan had access to 
detailed information about the northern airfields, the aircraft stationed at them, their 
defenses, their stores, and their OOB. As a grade three intelligence staff officer Heenan 
had access to practically everything his handlers could desire. Additionally, Heenan had 
been involved in devising the aerial defensive strategy in the event of invasion. 
Furthermore, he had access to the then equivalent of the IFF (Identity Friend or Foe) 
system that the British were using. This consisted of a set of Air Recognition Strips 
which allowed airmen to identify friendly ground forces, and a series of Air Recognition 
Codes that allowed friendly pilots to identify each other. As with so many other codes 
then, and now, they were supposed to be changed on a daily basis. 
Captain Patrick Stanley Vaughn Heenan potentially made the one of if not the 
single biggest contribution to the invasion’s early successes. His role in helping to plan 
the defensive aerial response to an invasion and his access to the IFF systems of the time 
are now apparent when looking at the events and corresponding reports of December 8
th
, 
1941. At Kota Bharu the Japanese invasion forces were guided to shore by signal lights 
displayed by Japanese agents. In response British aircraft were deployed, in the dark, to 
attack the Japanese troop transports. Upon arrival the British found their targets flashing 
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the correct RAF recognition signal for the day. It is highly probable that they received the 
signal and other codes for the day had been provided to them through the efforts of 
Captain Heenan.  
At the time of the invasion British RAF officers noted that the Japanese were 
incredibly successful at knowing where and when to catch the RAF on the ground. 
Repeatedly the Japanese caught the RAF pilots after returning from sorties when they 
were most vulnerable. Pilots and ground crew watched as the Japanese strafed and 
bombed the rows of their stationary aircraft with relative impunity. Basil Gotto, an RAF 
pilot, wrote the Japanese had “’… absolute air supremacy,’” and “’Our fighters…were 
having no success and were continually being caught having just landed.’”
147
 Jack Wells, 
another member of Heenan’s AIL section, recalled that on the day of the attacks 
Heenan’s actions gave away his knowledge. After learning of the attacks on Singapore 
and several airfields to the south, Wells inquired as to why they had not yet been hit yet 
seeing at they were on the front lines. Heenan’s response was simply that they would be. 
Wells recalled that after that exchange Heenan kept looking at his watch and watching a 
distinct portion of the sky. Wells realized only in hindsight that “’…he was expecting 
them [the Japanese]! He knew exactly when the blighters were coming!’”
148
 Shortly after 
telling Wells the Japanese would arrive, they did. Once over the airfield they proceeded 
to bomb the rows of parked aircraft being refueled and re-armed. Prior to the attack Wells 
and several other servicemen on the airfield re-called Heenan having disappeared, most 
likely radioing the Japanese of the impending arrival of British aircraft. 
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Time and again the RAF was being caught unawares after missions. In a report 
compiled in 1942 by General Wavell this was attributed to information being sent via 
radio from the area around the aerodromes. The agent in question was no doubt Captain 
Heenan. The timing of the attacks on the airfields is strong evidence of his complicity. As 
Jack Wells had observed there was no reason that the Japanese should have ignored Alor 
Star due to its position to the north of several other targets, including a nearby airfield 
that had been attacked at about 0730. The Japanese did not attack Alor Star was until 
1100 hours despite its close proximity to other frontline targets. Strategically and 
tactically there was no reason to ignore Alor Star, unless the Japanese knew that the 
field’s aircraft were out on sortie. The Japanese raid on Alor Star coincided perfectly with 
the return of its aircraft. The Japanese knew that an attack on Alor Star was pointless 
until Heenan had informed them of the RAF aircrafts’ return. Eventually the raids on 
Alor Star and its neighboring airfields resulted in the order to evacuate. Only a handful of 
obsolete Buffalo fighters and Blenheim bombers survived. 
The information that Heenan had provided the Japanese at the time of the invasion was, 
by all accounts, limited to the northern airfields. It proved to be disastrous for the British 
as the Japanese used it to devastating effect. Within the opening days of the Battle of 
Malaya they were able to force the British to abandon their frontline airfields, destroy the 
majority of the RAF and Commonwealth air forces, and ensure their own air superiority 
for the duration of the campaign. British Intelligence got on to Heenan and arrested him 
two days after the attacks on Malaya. Among the things discovered when his quarters 
were searched were sensitive documents, a codebook, and two radio transmitters. Among 




time of his arrest contemporary sources actually place him at the head of a vast network 
of Japanese spies that operated between Penang and the Thai border. As an AILO Heenan 
had access to secret information and he had been passing it on to the Japanese. Heenan 
was arrested after having been caught sending the current condition and deployment of 
aircraft to the Japanese, thus allowing them to repeatedly catch the pilots and planes on 
the ground. After his apprehension, Heenan was court-martialed in January of 1942, and 
summarily executed for his crimes in February of that same year.
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IJA Intelligence Collection Activities 
 At the end of the Second World War, the Japanese destroyed many of the records 
that pertained to their intelligence gathering activities. This has left modern historians 
with questions on not only how intelligence was gathered, but also what intelligence the 
Japanese did collect. However, there is enough surviving information to begin to give 
answers to some of these questions. A textbook used by the Japanese Army titled Joho 
Kinmu no Sanko (Text Book for Intelligence Duties) categorized intelligence gathering as 
belonging to one of two groups, information gathering or information duties. The 
intelligence activities carried out by attachés, businesses, corporations, and other overseas 
organizations fell under information gathering. Both OSINT and HUMINT played a large 
part in this category, as did observation, photography, and the debriefing of individuals. 
Lower levels of SIGINT were also categorized as information gathering. Information 
duties included spotting, use of reconnaissance units to locate targets, POW debriefs, 
captured documentation, and battlefield espionage.
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Clearly, the IJA was delineating between short-term, information duties, and long 
term, information gathering, operations as it planned for the invasion of Malaya. This was 
also something that both Britain and America did, and still do. The long term collection 
of data allowed Japan to understand the Malay region, its geography, and its population
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in a manner that the British did not. The Japanese long term efforts yielded significant 
results that included the readiness, disposition, and deployment of British Commonwealth 
forces. Their efforts alerted them to, and allowed them to target, disaffected portions of 
the populous that could help to undermine British authority. These early efforts also 
yielded geographical information that was essential in both planning the invasion and 
then navigating the terrain once their forces had landed. These activities are evidence that 
at the start of their Pacific thrust in 1941 the Japanese had an effective method of 
analyzing the data they had gathered, producing a useful product, and disseminating it 
along the proper channels to those who needed it. 
The term HUMINT carries with it the suggestion of James Bond-esque espionage. 
In reality, the majority of it is accomplished using attachés stationed in foreign embassies. 
IJA attachés collected information from their foreign counterparts, military officers, and 
collected OSINT from the local regions publications and news services. They also hired 
locals to act as their own personal assets and many embassies had a substantial budget for 
exactly that purpose. In 1941 alone the Imperial Japanese Army spent approximately 32 
billion yen, adjusted for inflation, on these types of intelligence operations. By the end of 
the war that amount ballooned to nearly 320 billion yen adjusted. The HUMINT activities 
of the IJA fell into three distinct categories: 1) against the European nations in the 




The vast web of spies the IJA cultivated produced results that were just as 
significant as any major intelligence coup and were just as useful in helping to defeat the 
Commonwealth forces. Many Japanese attachés, businessmen, and native Malayans went 
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on photographic excursions. These trips provided the Japanese with an abundance of 
useful intelligence for the invasion. They helped to map the network of local trails and 
roads that ran along the Malaya and Thailand border. The condition of these roads, their 
bridges, connections and intersections, and their ultimate destinations were of vital 
importance to the Japanese. Ultimately, the information helped the Japanese forces to 
advance through terrain that would have otherwise been foreign and impossible to 
navigate. F Kikan’s subversion efforts made this even easier. 
 In the years before the war the Japanese utilized their attachés to collect a 
substantial amount of intelligence. The collecting happened in the West just as frequently 
and with just as many positive results as it did in the Southeast Asian countries. IJN 
Captain Sanematsu Yuzuru and several other fellow IJN officers were stationed across 
the United States in places like Los Angeles and Washington where they collected 
information on the US Navy. Back in the Japan IJA officers who were considered experts 
on selected countries were sent to those regions to gather intelligence. Sometimes as part 
of a ryugakusei other times covertly. Yet others were sent to places like Spain, Finland, 
and Sweden. The intelligence collected by IJA officers sent to Europe has been assessed 
as having a high degree of accuracy. Japanese planning and collection activities were not 
only selecting targets of importance tactically and operationally, they were executing on 
their plans as well.
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 The Imperial Japanese Army collected significant amounts of data on the troop 
deployments of various Western powers in the Far East. This information included 
HUMINT and COMINT that was then classified according to its accuracy. Japanese 
intelligence operations also employed OSINT extensively. In the 1930s this was a 
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developing field of intelligence gathering, still in its nascent stages. It was not until 1941 
that the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service turned radio into a source of information 
for the US. There were also agencies in every country that collected the periodicals and 
trade publications for analysis. Colonel William Donovan (1883-1959) was once advised 
that he could find better intelligence than could be provided by anyone in the West on the 
state of Japanese shipbuilding by simply analyzing the Japanese press. The Japanese, for 
instance, were able to stay abreast US aerospace development by monitoring Aviation 
Week. This earned the publication the moniker “Aviation Leak” as a result of the 
intelligence it provided. Once hostilities commenced OSINT was a way to replace some 
of the intelligence lost as a result of the removal of Japanese personnel when embassies 
closed. The Domei News Agency for instance compiled, translated, and passed on the 
news from every country around the world on a daily basis. With these efforts came the 
task of deciphering the true intentions behind a nation’s published news, and of whether 
it was factual or not. Confirmed Japanese OSINT sources for the pre-war years included 
Reuters, AP, The New York Times, Life, and Time magazine.
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 Photography played a key role on all the sides during the war. Especially 
important was professional press photography. The Japanese in one instance learned of 
the latest British anti-aircraft (AA) weaponry when a picture of dignitaries arriving on the 
British battleship King George V was printed in the January 1941 Life magazine. In the 
background was Britain’s latest AA rocket launcher. Considering that at the time the 
most advanced IJN AA weaponry was still machine guns, this was a significant piece of 
intelligence. When the Japanese took the Palembang oil fields in Sumatra, they utilized 
the local maps provided in easily obtained publications. Detail was then added to the 
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maps, in addition to data on oilfields and airfields, provided Japanese businesses 
operating in the area. 
At the onset of the Pacific War Japan’s chief opponent were the British Forces 
deployed in Malaya. Because of this the IJA increased intelligence gathering on the 
British in the late 1930s and then stepped up operations again in late 1940 as a precursor 
to war. One of the key assessments that made by the Japanese intelligence community 
was that the British colonial garrisons were a composite force. The Japanese appraisal of 
Commonwealth forces concluded they were comprised primarily of men from the nations 
of Great Britain, India, and Australia. The Japanese then went on to evaluate each of the 
three groups. The British they assessed as being a difficult enemy to overcome in battle, 
but due to being colonial forces and limited in number they would fall. The Japanese also 
predicted that the Commonwealth forces would fight a predominantly defensive battle as 
most were stationed in defense of Singapore. The Japanese prediction played out to be 
unequivocally true as all but one of the British actions was defensive in nature. Thus in 
the invasion of Malaya they would not play a significant factor. The Japanese evaluated 
the Australians as being poorly trained and poorly equipped. They would present a 
difficult fight based on their national character, stubbornness and bravery, but in the end, 
they too would fail to stop a Japanese attack. This also came to pass as the Australians 
mounted an uncompromising defense of Johore and handed the Japanese Army its first 
tactical setback of the campaign. Finally, and maybe most importantly, the Japanese 
appraised the Indian and Malayan soldiers as having no desire to fight for the British. 
Instead, the Japanese discovered most of them to have anti-British sentiment and the 




the various Indian and Malayan factions in order to prevent unity and maintain power. 
This meant that the British had almost no real support in a fight against an invader. If the 
Japanese took the time to understand the Indian and Malayan demographics and their 
motivations, they would have a powerful tool to use against the British. 
 While the Japanese seemed to think lightly of British Commonwealth soldiers, the 
key element that they hit upon was the disharmony between the British and their colonial 
subjects. Even though the Japanese believed the British troops possessed a reasonable 
fighting ability, their relations with their Indian comrades and the native soldiers was 
poor at best. As a result, they had undermined their own ability to mount any significant 
defense of Malaya. The detailed intelligence gathering operations preceding the Malayan 
invasion meant that the Imperial Japanese Army not only had a clear picture of the 
geography on which it was going to fight, the military capability of forces it would face, 
but that it also had a firm grasp on the social makeup of its opponent. 
In the period preceding the invasion F Kikan lead the way in subverting British 
authority. As a long-term strategy the Japanese expended a considerable amount of 
resources supporting and encouraging various Asian independence movements. The 
lion’s share of the effort was concentrated on the Indians, both civilian and those in the 
Commonwealth forces, living in Malaya. Japanese intelligence had identified, and rightly 
so, this distinct group as being the most susceptible to their efforts. F Kikan in particular 
had been instrumental in implementing this strategy in Malaya. The unit targeted Indian 
nationals and quickly set up a network of subversive agents across all of northern Malaya. 




colonial resentment not only in the local populations but also among the ranks of the 
Commonwealth forces.  
Because of the Japanese subversive efforts, its army units had local guides to help 
them navigate Malaya and that some of the Commonwealth units turned on and betrayed 
their British officers. Because the Indian Army constituted almost half of the 
Commonwealth forces in Malaya, the ability to sow discord among them was an 
important factor in their campaign and one that is often overlooked today when studying 
the Battle of Malaya. Captain Heenan was a white Indian officer who exhibited empathy 
towards his Indian comrades while harboring vast resentment against his British peers. 
He stands as an example of what the Japanese efforts highest goals were. 
 As was previously indicated in this thesis, Thailand served as the base of 
intelligence gathering activities in Southeast Asia. As the only independent nation in the 
region it was possible for Japanese intelligence agencies to set up bases of operation in 
cities like Bangkok. From these locations they were able to concentrate their efforts on 
the targets in the region that held the most value to them, places like Malaya and 
Singapore. From his headquarters in Bangkok, Colonel Tamura Hiroshi collected 
information on geography, cartography, British Commonwealth forces, and other areas of 
interest vital to the coming war effort. Tamura executed a methodical analysis of the 
routes the IJA would take through southern Thailand and the landing points it would use 
on the Malay Peninsula. These studies were essential to the early surprise and success 
that the Japanese enjoyed in the Battle of Malaya. 
 Starting in the summer of 1940 the Japanese intelligence efforts in the Southeast 




the coming war with Britain. The activities that the Japanese took clearly demonstrated 
the same well-developed features as their Western counterparts as discussed above. The 
Japanese were planning their missions and targets on a vast strategic level in Tokyo. 
However, they were planning also from a strategic, tactical, and operational standpoint on 
a lower level from bases situated within the regions of interest to them. They were 
exercising all the same collections techniques as the West and from their success we can 
glean the fact that their analysis and dissemination of the finished intelligence product 
was also effective. Simply put, British and Allied failures in the Pacific were not purely a 
symptom of unpreparedness and underestimation of the Japanese. Instead when looking 
at the larger picture and including the Japanese narrative, it can be observed that success 
like the Battle of Malaya were the result of a long term intelligence operation that aided 
in the advanced training of Japanese forces for the coming fight. 
While none of the information discovered or revealed to date points to an 
intelligence homerun for the Japanese, they were nevertheless able to gather enough 
pieces of the puzzle overall to make a significant impact on their operations in late 1941. 
At the start of their invasion of Malaya their intelligence and subversion efforts had set 
the stage for a highly successful campaign. The Japanese spun a great web of espionage 
over Southeast Asia utilizing military, commercial, and civilian sources in its 
construction. Examples of military intelligence Japanese successes included the 
acquisition of information on RAF facilities and a naval base that was under construction. 
The RAF data was obtained from an RAF aircraftsman. The plans for the naval base were 
purchased in 1933. In 1934 a Japanese businessman failed in an attempt to purchase the 




diagrams and maps of railway networks for various regions within Southeast Asia. In 
1937 they successfully secured the plans to the Woodlands Railway switch that operated 
between Malaya and Singapore as a border crossing checkpoint. Prior to gaining the 
plans to the Woodlands switch, Japanese intelligence efforts had procured the drawings 
of the Causeway that linked the mainland and Singapore. Additionally, they gained vital 
information on the submarine and coastal defenses located throughout Malaya. One 




The vast web of Japanese pre-war espionage in the Pacific and Indian Oceans 
reached as far south as Australia, west into India, and as far east as Hawaii. Inspector 
General of Police, Straits Settlements, René Onraet made, perhaps, the best assessment of 
Japanese intelligence activities in Malaya. Writing in 1945, Onraet mused on how the 
Japanese had spent the better part of twenty years after the Great War expanding their 
trade, understanding, and presence in Malaya. They were everywhere, or at least it 
appeared that way. The British and other Europeans saw the activities of the Japanese 
travelers, photographers, and those from other various and sundry occupations as a real 
threat. The reality was that the managers, chair people, and chiefs of major business and 
banking institutions were the real danger. This included those individuals posted in 
government facilities like Shinozaki Mamorou.
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As Onraet recollected the Japanese activities, he fell convinced that what he had 
observed was the slow and calculated preparation for the events that unfolded in the late 
1930s and culminated with the defeat of the British Commonwealth forces in the Battle 
of Malaya. It was easy for them, Onraet surmised, because no one considered that a 
future military success would be possible. Malaya was the Gibraltar of the East. Yet, not 
only was it possible, but it depended on the patient intelligence gathering effort the 
Japanese had embarked on after World War 1. It was an effort based on the highly 
developed intelligence system that the Japanese had spent the last seventy plus years 
developing. By 1938 Onraet had been so deeply concerned about the level of espionage 
in Malaya, conducted in large part by the Japanese employed in commercial endeavors, 
that he had introduced legislation requiring that at least half of those companies’ 
employees be non-Japanese. His warning and concerns went unheeded.
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Refining the IJA Intelligence System 
The late 1930s were a tumultuous time for the Imperial Japanese Army. The 
Army General Staff began to consider ways to boost their intelligence gathering 
capabilities. The bolstering of open source intelligence gathering and signals intelligence 
analysis was a primary concern. At the same time an effort was being led to revise the 
Military Secret Act and make intelligence work more methodical and scientific. The act 
had been created in 1894 just after the First Sino-Japanese War and had remained 
virtually unchanged since then.
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Several major changes occurred in the IJA intelligence apparatus in 1936. The 
Japanese formed a Russian section in order to intensify collections against that nation and 
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to alleviate the overload on the European and American sections who, up until that point, 
had also taken on the task of covering Russia in addition to their normal duties. A 
Conspiracy section was created as direct result of the attempted military coup in Tokyo 




 The IJA also formed a counter-intelligence 
section at this time. Then in 1937 the institution that became the famous Nakano School 
was established. 
There were two primary reasons for the creation of the Nakano School. Prior to its 
formation the IJA recruited its intelligence officers from the foreign language college or 
the Army Staff College. The number of graduates from the former was limited and the 
latter did not teach of the intelligence skillset necessary for intelligence operations. In the 
majority of the cases the newly hired foreign language graduates gained the needed skills 
through on the job experience. IJA intelligence was severely understaffed and it needed 
qualified, trained, individuals to fill its ranks in order to fulfill its mission. The Nakano 
School provided the solution to those issues. The school had four objectives: 1) bring the 
Japanese intelligence apparatus back up to speed as compared to its Western 
counterparts; 2) utilize the latest scientific, logic, and technological innovations for 
analysis; 3) exploit the skills and specialties of its staff; 4) develop its members to their 
fullest potential. The school also invested in an ideological education for its students. The 
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The creation of the Nakano School appeared to have addressed the deficiencies in 
the Imperial Japanese Army’s intelligence system. It also contributed to the preparations 
for the Pacific War. Ultimately, the Nakano School would send almost two thousand of 
its graduates into the PTO. The IJA had thus improved its intelligence. From 1936 
forward it dealt more efficiently with Russia and it stepped up its operations against the 
British. However, it failed to make major advancements in its overall efforts against the 
United States. 
In the Southern Region Fujiwara Iwaichi and his IJA intelligence unit, F Kikan, 
supported local independence movements. The movements helped to erode the strength 
of the Commonwealth forces garrisoned in Malaya and Singapore. Prior to the War F 
Kikan made contact Yutaka Kani and Pritam Singh. Singh was a member of the I.I.L. and 
together with Fujiwara Iwaichi he negotiated IJA support for the I.I.L. That agreement 
stipulated that in the case of war the I.I.L. would use its influence to draw 
Commonwealth Indian forces away from their units utilizing propaganda and other 
methods. Yutaka Tani led a band of Malayan freedom fighters that numbered over three 
thousand strong. Fujiwara used him and his army as an informal intelligence source 
gathering crucial information on Malayan affairs and organizations. 
Once the Japanese thrust into the Pacific had started I.I.L. teams went to the front 
with F Kikan officers and began to recruit Indians from the Commonwealth units, 
persuading them to switch sides. Upon the British surrender of Singapore the Japanese 
took 45,000 Indian POWs. Fujiwara informed them that they would not be POWs but 




India. He then presented them to their new commander Mohan Singh formerly of the 
British Indian Army. This group became the First Indian National Army. 
Examining the IJA intelligence activities of the IJA in the Southern Area it 
becomes apparent the Britain’s defeat was unavoidable. IJA intelligence activities 
carefully and thoroughly explored the topography of Malaya, probed British military 
affairs, and scrutinized the politics of the region. The kosakus identified unrest among the 
Commonwealth forces and conducted operations with the goal of creating division with 
the British ranks. It must be acknowledged that the British also handicapped themselves. 
They failed to engage in any serious counter-intelligence activities and they failed to 
objectively evaluate their opponent. Instead they relied on subjective analysis based on 
unscientific ethnic beliefs that rated the IJA as a second rate force. While these definitely 
factored into the British defeat, in no way should they detract from the capability and 
effort the Japanese displayed in their intelligence operations in the region. 
Analysis and Exploitation 
 Analysis is the process that creates a useful intelligence product out of the 
information that is collected. While the current narrative says that the Japanese system of 
exploitation was inadequate, this was far from the truth. It is true that prior to the war the 
Japanese had no overarching organization that could integrate the data from the multiple 
intelligence departments that existed. The respective intelligence sections of the IJA and 
the IJN unilaterally performed analysis of the collected information. The final results, 
intelligence product, would then be reported to the other sections within the parent 
organization. The primary recipients of the intelligence were the various operations 




the reliability of the intelligence, exactly like today. Their Kakudo (level of certainty) 
consisted of four ratings: 1) Ko (certain), must be confirmed by SIGINT, OSINT, and 
HUMINT; 2) Ostsu (almost certain), confirmed by two out of the three elements; 3) Hei 
(a bit uncertain), this was assigned to information obtained for the first time but with an 
analytical context; 4) Tei (uncertain), no confirmation of any sort. Captain Sanematsu 
Yuzuru writing on the topic of the confidence that the Japanese had in their analysis and 
evaluation practices commented on the different levels of the intelligence cycle they used. 
He wrote that it was comprised of four individual steps: 1) collection; 2) evaluation; 3) 
distillation; 4) judgment.
160
 It is obvious how that process very nearly mirrors the one 
used as an analytical model for this thesis. The distillation step, step three for the 
Japanese, corresponds with the analysis and production step of the model used here. The 
Japanese began the habit of checking the accuracy of their work against the actual actions 
of their enemy. Any discrepancy between the analysis and fact was examined to see 
where the fault was and to ascertain if it was correctable. This was the judgement stage, 
stage four for the Japanese, and it corresponds to the evaluation stage in the ODNI 
Intelligence cycle model presented in this thesis.  The difference between the two 
intelligence cycles lies in the fact that the evaluation step in the presented model is both a 
distinct step an ongoing background process that occurs at every point in the cycle. This 
illustrates how the Japanese were not only analyzing, but also judging the quality of the 
intelligence that they were producing. The Japanese use of objective standards and a 
defined process in analyzing their intelligence proves that their intelligence system was 
operating as efficiently, if not more so, and in a similar manner to their Western 
counterparts. 
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Where was the failure? 
 To this day there is a lack of understanding of Japanese military and intelligence 
capabilities during World War II. This has led to the continued belief that their early 
successes had more to do with Western failures and incompetence then their own hard 
work and planning. This stems from the same attitude that led the British to 
underestimate their capabilities in the Pacific and Indian Oceans prior to the opening of 
hostilities. Upon closer examination, it is apparent that the Japanese not only had all the 
military virtues that the West so coveted but also had similar resources and capabilities, 
especially in the realm of intelligence gathering. So why did the Japanese ultimately lose 
the intelligence war? 
 One aspect that must be considered was the acceptance and use of intelligence by 
field commanders. In the Japanese military the reception of intelligence varied greatly 
from commander to commander. While this was a problem that was seen in the West, it 
potentially was not as severe as it was in the Japanese military ranks. For some Japanese 
commanders intelligence was not a highly regarded function. Notable within the context 
of this work is the case of Lieutenant General Mutaguchi. Stationed in Southeast Asia, he 
believed that the fighting spirit of his men was all that was required to achieve his goals 
and the failure of his campaign to invade India rested squarely on his disregard of the 
intelligence provided to him on enemy disposition and strength. On the other hand, 
Lieutenant General Sakurai’s Chief of Staff, Major-General Iwakura Hideo, was 
dedicated to the use of intelligence. In his employ was an agent who had been trained in 
Cairo and spoke Arabic. The use of this agent led to the successful recruitment of assets 




infiltrated British lines in a Burmese disguise and sent detailed intelligence on British 
unit strength, position, and the surrounding terrain to his handlers. 
 The failure of some IJA commanders to accept intelligence as being important to 
their overall success raises the question of how well the Japanese army applied the 
Intelligence Cycle to its operations. The first step of the cycle is Planning and Direction. 
Prior to the Battle of Malaya, there was a top down approach to intelligence. IJA General 
Staff in Tokyo were making decisions on what the goals were and deploying assets. 
Fujiwara Iwaichi and the other kikan commanders are proof of this. That is not to say that 
there was not planning and direction going on at lower levels, there was. The majority of 
that kind of activity, though, seemed to fall into categories where discretion and 
autonomy were required in order to fulfill the larger mission at hand. This kind of 
operation lies in stark contrast to what was going on in China in the 1930s when IJA 
elements were acting completely of their own accord, and often against orders, and in the 
latter of half of WW II when things began to fall apart thanks to rivalry within the 
Japanese ranks. 
 The Second step of the Intelligence Cycle is Collections. Prior to the Invasion of 
Malaya and on through the Pacific War the Japanese excelled at both HUMINT and 
OSINT. These were by far the Japanese military’s strongest two collection disciplines 
and their successes during their thrust into the Pacific in early 1941 stand as an example 
of how important these were. The Battle of Malaya was a one sided affair because of the 
intelligence Japanese operatives, both formal and informal, were able to collect on the 
British Commonwealth forces’ disposition, makeup, deployment, and readiness. Later in 




IJN intelligence was able to accurately assess American Naval losses in several battles 
and even predict the time and location of several USN offensives. Unfortunately, these 
came at a time in the war when operations ignored intelligence reporting for a myriad of 
reasons. 
 The third and fourth steps of the cycle are Processing and Exploitation, and 
Analysis and Production. Both the IJA and the IJN performed these step unilaterally. This 
was the result of not having a central governing agency or department for intelligence 
operations. Virtually every other nation in the conflict shared this failure. As a result, bits 
of information acquired by one agency that would have completed a picture when paired 
with data from another agency never passed across the same desk. Vertical 
communication meant that transmission of intelligence from one intelligence operations 
department to another was difficult, if not impossible. Inter-service and political rivalries 
compounded the problem in the latter stages of the war. These issues affected the final 
step of the Intelligence Cycle, Dissemination, as well. By the second half of the war 
information was not being shared openly and there were even cases of competing 
intelligence agencies keeping tabs on each other in order to curry favor. 
 The last component of the Intelligence Cycle is Evaluation. It is not only the sixth 
step but also an ongoing process during each of the other five steps. Japanese intelligence 
operations illustrate an objective and scientific approach to the evaluation of intelligence. 
Early on IJA and IJN intelligence departments are applying complex mathematical 
formulas and algorithms to categorize data. Japanese analysts were also grading the 
reliability of the information based on specific criteria. The IJA and the IJN were 




can be accessed as being ahead of the US and Britain in that both of those countries were 
performing intelligence through power versus intelligence through mind. Ultimately, 
steps four through six suffered from the previously stated flaws in addition to a creeping 
top down corruption that resulted from commanders not wanting to communicate bad 
news to their superiors for fear of reprisal. 
In the 1930s the Japanese goal was create a Pan-Asian economic bloc. The 
defensive plan chosen by the politicians failed to include both the IJA and the IJN. Since 
the IJA and IJN each had their own political component the defense plan essentially 
allowed for three separate goals to be pursued. The failure to unite all three entities in a 
common purpose would have long lasting effects. At the breakout of the Second World 
War the government and the IJA favored an alliance with Germany while the political 
component of the IJN resisted the idea. During the 1940s the part that intelligence played 
in the larger strategic plan was limited. Both political and military Japanese leadership 
contained many individuals who did not necessarily see the value of foreign intelligence. 
This was a symptom of the fact that bureaucrats in the government, IJA, and IJN were 
dictating grand strategy simultaneously. Complicating the matter further was the fact that 
none of three groups involved were operating from the same playbook. The result was 
that the decision making process did not require intelligence to proceed. Instead, it 
needed personal and departmental connections to get decisions made. 
 Complicating matters was the fact that the Japanese had no body dedicated to 
making decisions on Japanese Grand Strategy. The role had originally been filled by the 
Genro, veteran advisers to the Emperor, but by the start of the 1930s the last of those had 




specialty was tactical and not strategic planning. By the late 1930s as the IJA attempted 
to fill the role left vacant by the deceased Genro the it tried to formulate both political 
and military strategy. Ultimately, the IJA’s decisions and efforts precipitated the Second-
Sino Japanese War and lead to the Pacific War. This illustrates the failure of high level 
Japanese military and political leadership to integrate the intelligence that they possessed. 
The model that both the IJA and IJN followed internally at their lower levels that ensured 
dissemination of information was absent at the higher levels of control. The struggle for 
political power at these higher levels contributed considerably to this issue. As the 
Second World War progressed this failure to integrate would creep down through the 
levels of leadership and was one cause of the eventual rift between intelligence sections, 
operations departments, and command.
161
 
 There were also numerous cases of Japanese codes being read. This was more of 
an issue for the IJN than the IJA. Most famous amongst the naval failures are those that 
led to the disastrous Battle of Midway and the loss of Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku (1884-
1943). The effect of these compromises on IJN policy, strategy, and the overall state of 
the war cannot be ignored. Yet in the case of the IJA effective counterintelligence 
apparatuses existed and there is no proof of IJA ciphers being read until late in the war. 
Despite the compromises the IJN leadership failed to enact any countermeasures. 
Furthermore, the IJN failed to investigate thoroughly the reason for the compromises and 
thus did not know what the proper countermeasures were. The Japanese responses to 
these events and others later on are problematic in that they did not approach even a low 
level of counterintelligence. The lack of IJN counterintelligence awareness was the root 
of several major issues. The IJA did not suffer from this malady. 
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 Another issue that plagued Japanese intelligence operations was the misuse and 
misappropriation of talented personnel as either a result of incompetence or inter-service 
rivalry. Concerning the outfits described in this thesis Major Fujiwara Iwaichi stands as 
an example of this kind of bungling. Fujiwara, the successful leader of F Kikan, was 
reassigned to General Headquarters soon after the invasion of Malaya was complete. This 
mistake precipitated a later crisis in which the relationship between the Indian subversive 
elements, the newly formed INA, and the Japanese fell apart. Fujiwara’s replacement, 
Major-General Iwakuro Hideo, was a capable individual militarily speaking. What he 
lacked was any experience in dealing with the Indians in Malaya. He was too rigid and 
inflexible, and he failed to understand the feelings, aspirations, and motivations of his 
allies. As a result, whenever there was a difference of opinion on matters his attitude was 
not helpful. Instead, Iwakuro often took on a position of superiority and arrogance 
bolstered by Japan’s military successes. Eventually this led to a loss of close co-operation 
and both sides became distrustful of the other’s motives. This cost the Japanese valuable 
assets in terms of intelligence and military operations.
162
 
The Americans also made similar grievous mistakes in the management of their 
personnel. Joseph Rochefort stands as an example of the latter in American intelligence 
history. Assigned to Station HYPO at Pearl Harbor, Rochefort was sure the next Japanese 
attack would be in the Central Pacific. Meanwhile, a competing intelligence group, OP-
20-G, based in Washington was positive it would be somewhere else. The time of the 
attack was also a source of disagreement between the two operations. Rochefort and his 
group devised a simple test to determine what the target was and succeeded in revealing 
that it was Midway. Ultimately, Rochefort was correct about both the location and time 
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of the attack. Soon after, Rochefort was re-assigned to command a floating dry dock, the 
result of embarrassing the commander of OP-20-G who just happened to be the brother of 
the Director of Naval Communications, Rocehfort’s boss. 
 One of the largest issues that the Japanese faced was a lack of intelligence 
dissemination amongst different elements of the military. Information silos became 
common practice as the war progressed. By the latter half of the war not only were the 
various agencies not sharing intelligence but they were actively keeping tabs on one 
another in an effort to gain favor among the leadership. This was compounded by the 
leadership of each service relying more on its own assessments than on the information 
gathered by its respective intelligence agency. It became so bad in the Imperial Japanese 
Army by the end of the war that its intelligence division was absent any real function. 
The situation was muddied further when policy and operations departments also began to 
compile and disseminate their own intelligence product. It became almost impossible in 
many instances to have an objective grasp of any situation as a result of the sheer volume 
of information that had been acquired. 
 A perfect example of this was when Japanese Naval Intelligence ascertained that 
an attack on the Marianas by the USN was imminent. They even correctly judged the 
window for the attack to be from May to June. The Naval Operations Bureau, though, 
decided to ignore the Intelligence Bureau’s assessment of what became the Battle of the 
Philippine Sea. Part of the issue was that the Operations Bureau was conducting its own 
analysis of available information, and amateur individuals with little to no actual 
intelligence experience were doing it. The situation was made worse because operations 




arms of the service often drew criticism and derision from those in operations because 
they “’… were not in the field of action, and they did not see the results. It is inexcusable 
for them to comment on war results….’”
163
 The effects of this attitude can be seen in the 
tabulation of the battle results. A famous example of this kind of problem was the 
misreporting of the battle results from the Battle of Taiwan-Okinawa. The Intelligence 
Bureau of the IJN had determined through intercepted communications and open source 
intelligence that at best the USN had lost one carrier and one battleship. Operations had 
claimed, however, that the Japanese sunk nineteen carriers and four battleships. The USN 
had only had seventeen carriers in the operation. Had this been true that victory would 
have meant the annihilation of the entire USN carrier force in the Western Pacific. 
Another example of the ineptitude of IJN Operations to assess intelligence accurately was 
the fact that over the course of the war they claimed that the Saratoga had been sunk four 




 When looking at the larger picture of the entire Pacific War, it becomes clear that 
in the early stages of the conflict Japanese intelligence was both well developed and 
incredibly effective. The Japanese intelligence apparatus was utilizing all the steps of the 
intelligence cycle that the West was with as much acuity.
165
 Furthermore, the military, the 
IJA in particular, utilized the information provided them to great effect at the beginning 
of war as has been shown. The Battle of Malaya is a valuable case study supporting that 
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conclusion. The result is that historians must discard the old idea that Japanese success 
was primarily the product of Allied negligence. Instead, the strategic and tactical success 
of the Japanese rested squarely on their patient application of intelligence toward a 
specific end. This is also where the first intimation of future failure also occurs. The 
Japanese had been growing and expanding and since the turn of the century they had 
possessed a very definite long term goal. In the case of Malaya they spent the better part 
of ten years building their networks before ramping up their effort in the final year before 
the shooting war began. Once the conflict started though and they did not achieve the fast 
victory they had planned for, they failed to adapt their intelligence to a short-term fluid 
situation. 
 As the war progressed, there was also a measurable deterioration in the utilization 
of intelligence as illustrated in the short example of the Battle of Taiwan-Okinawa and 
the faulty assessment of USN carrier losses. By the end of the war the intelligence 
bureaus’ functionality was absent from all strategic and tactical decisions. The 
operational bureaus and the leadership had taken to using their own amateurish 
assessments leading to dismal military operations. There are many reasons for why this 
happened, in fighting and competition between the services and their branches, the failure 
to decipher codes, counterintelligence issues, and the failure to share intelligence both 
within and between the IJN and the IJA. The IJA and IJN triumphed early in the war due 
to the efforts of their intelligence divisions. However, the degeneration of the integration 
of intelligence systems into operations over the course of the conflict resulted in Japan’s 






The Scrutable Westerners and Japanese Intelligence in WW II 
The current view of Japanese intelligence operations during the Second World 
War in particular, even among Japanese historians, is that the Japanese were inferior to 
the West in almost all respects. This inferiority is believed to have played no small part in 
their eventual defeat. SIGINT is often used as the best example of how far behind the 
Allies the Japanese were. The problem with this view, and the SIGINT example in 
particular, is that the conclusions drawn are based almost solely on information from the 
Allied nations’ archives, American accounts in particular. It is apparent that those who 
analyzed this information became the victims of the biases belonging to those who 
collected and recorded the data as well as their own personal beliefs. As a result they, 
almost wholly, have concluded that Japanese intelligence was lacking in both the ability 
and in the seemingly vast resources that the Americans had available to them. Yet it was 
not just a few years before that the exact opposite was believed true. 
 In the years following World War II and on through the early 1980s historians had 
become accustomed to the image of the omnipresent Japanese spy. Whether they were 
the businessman, the tourist, or the local doctor, they were always there waiting, 
watching, and reporting. This was an image that was perhaps first conceived when 
Russian authors talked about the discovery of a Japanese agent in the heart of Moscow 




of the Second World War by British Major-General Smyth who reported that the 
Japanese had infiltrated every level of the local population so that none of his movements 
went unreported. The exploits of individuals like Yoshikawa Takeo, mentioned at the 
start of this work, did not detract from this myth in any way. 
 The reality, as in most cases, lies somewhere in between these two points of view. 
Currently it remains undiscovered by historians. In truth, many of the resources that 
America and the Allies had available to them were also available to the Japanese. In 
several cases, such as the Battle of Malaya and the attack on Pearl Harbor, the 
foundations of military success were extremely effective intelligence operations. Yet, at 
the same time, Japan also failed to exploit some of the advantages that it had. The result 
was that it suffered because of those failures. The Japanese were not alone in their 
mistakes, the Allies shared many of the same failings. Japan suffered not only from a lack 
of a central intelligence authority but also from inter-agency and inter-service 
competition. These issues also plagued the Americans and the rest of the Allies. As has 
already been illustrated, Japan not only had learned from the European powers in the 
mid-nineteenth century but had spent the seventy plus odd years leading up to the Second 
World War cultivating an effective intelligence apparatus. It had been instrumental in the 
decision to take on the Chinese in the First Sino-Japanese War and it had been influential 
in the defeat of the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War. By the time of World War Two 
it would be appurtenant to Eastern and Western countries. 
 Presently, the commanding thesis about Japanese Intelligence capability in both 
Japanese and Western narratives, both military and intelligence, has focused on SIGINT. 




information about the breaking of Japanese codes it has been admittedly difficult, even 
for Japanese academics, not to attribute American success to the achievements of this 
program. The continued disclosure of information about ULTRA and its achievements 
has only served to further negatively impact the evaluation of Japanese achievements in 
this field. Nor has it helped to understand the role that SIGINT played in Japanese 
planning. The extensive burn campaign Japanese military forces launched in 1945 have 
complicated the issue. The chief Japanese signals intelligence unit, Owada Tsushin-Tai, 
destroyed all of its records. Additionally, many of the unit’s agents went into hiding for 
fear of reprisal for their activities. They wanted to avoid interrogation by the US 
occupation forces. The only information currently available on Japanese SIGINT is based 
primarily on oral histories that carry their own set of issues to deal with, difficulties like 
the fact that Japanese codebreakers were keenly aware of their position at the end of the 
war. As a result, they feared retaliation amongst other potential punishments and had no 
issues telling those who conducted their debriefings half-truths and outright lies.
166
 
The case of Seizo Arisue (1895-1992) provides a closing example of why 
Japanese intelligence operations in the Second World War must be re-evaluated. Seizo 
surrendered with many other Japanese officers to MacArthur during the occupation in 
Japan in 1945. Within a year he was debriefed and it is as a result of that interrogation 
that historian David Kahn argued in his chapter “Codebreaking in World Wars I and II” 
in The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth 
Century that Japan along with two other major belligerents could be eliminated from the 
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 Seizo according to the records cited by Kahn had claimed that 
the Japanese had failed to break American cryptosystems.
168
 However, documents 
released by the Central Intelligence Agency in 2005 under the Nazi War Crimes 
Disclosure Act reveal Seizo to be an individual who possessed both a clever and cunning 
nature. Early on in the documents, Seizo was characterized as untrustworthy and 
duplicitous. The author of one section of the documents suspects Seizo of delivering 
intelligence to the Soviets via a courier he describes as “a cute little number who may 
also be his [Seizo] mistress.”
169
 Furthermore, in notes entered in March of 1951 Seizo 
was characterized as an power hungry individual utilizing his relations with the American 
occupation forces in order to “… salvage personal power which he knows will crumble 
rapidly as soon as the Americans are no longer under control.”
170
  
Admittedly, this information came to light twenty-five years after Kahn originally 
wrote his article, but it illustrates the pitfalls of relying on the interrogation records and 
oral histories of Japanese intelligence officers and assuming they were giving full 
disclosure. What successes may the Japanese have had in SIGINT that were protected by 
individuals like Seizo? It is also an excellent example of why the subject of Japanese 
intelligence operations needs revisited and revised. Kahn’s work Codebreakers: The 
Story of Secret Writing published in 1967 is still regarded by many as the definitive 
history of cryptography. Yet in the chapter on Japanese efforts in cryptology he spends 
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the majority of his time lauding the hard work and genius of Joe Rochefort and American 
cryptographic ingenuity while simultaneously denigrating the Japanese efforts. Kahn 
describes Japanese successes as happening only “in extraordinarily favorable 
circumstances” in the pre-war years and proceeds to elaborate on how they were 
“unequal to the task” throughout the rest of the section.
171
 The bias of the history is 
evident in the chapter title alone, “The Scrutable Orientals,” and as with his later chapter 
in The Missing Dimension he again leans heavily on the post war Seizo concessions, “We 
couldn’t break your codes at all.”
172
 While other aspects of the work may still hold up its 
analysis of more recent events, particularly those involving the Japanese before and 
during the Second World War, must now be called into question, as the current accepted 
narrative must also be. Furthermore, this example also demonstrates how the singular 
focus on SIGINT as the primary benchmark for measuring the success level of an 
organization’s intelligence efforts fails to acknowledge other vital areas of intelligence 
gathering. While much, if not all, of the information on Japanese signals work has been 
lost there is considerable information available on their other efforts and on the successes 
that they had in those fields. These other vital areas should be examined more closely and 
then be used to re-evaluate Japanese intelligence efforts during World War II. 
 This thesis has been only a rudimentary and precursory attempt at re-evaluating 
Japanese Intelligence operations during the Second World War. It is clear from the 
history briefly touched on as the foundation of this effort that the implications of 
Japanese intelligence organizations’ actions are not only voluminous but also have had 
much greater impact than they given credit for. This is especially true when looking at 
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World War II. As has been seen a reasonable or adequate history could, arguably in some 
case has, been written from Allied sources but the result is one that is both full of gaps 
and skewed in favor of America and its allies. It is possible, though, to write a history 
derived from the careful study of the information contained in archives, oral histories, 
and interrogations. Historians must then take this data and construct a framework from 
which the unknown and the lost can be postulated and as a result create a more accurate 
and dynamic image of Japanese intelligence accomplishments and effectiveness. The 
information exists. New data is appearing every year as with the example of the 
documents on Arisue Seizo. Some already exists in an astonishingly unabridged form like 
that on the Nakano School. Yet other information is patchy at best if not lost almost 
entirely such as that related to IJA signals intelligence during the Pacific War. Never the 
less, there are enough pieces of the puzzle presently, with more being found every year, 
for us to begin to build a more balanced and clear picture of Japanese intelligence during 





Aldrich, Richard. Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britian, America and the 
Politics of Secret Service. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
Allen, Louis. Japan: The Years of Triumph From Feudal Isolation to Pacific empire. 
New York: American Heritage Press, 1971. 
Allen, Louis. "Japanese Intelligence Systems." Journal of Contemporary History 22, no. 
4 (October 1987): 547-562. 
—. Singapore 1941-1942. London: Frank Cass and Co. LTD., 1977. 
Andrew, Christopher. "Codebreakers and Foreign Offices: The French, British and 
American Experience." In The Missing Dimension: Governents and Intelligence 
Communities in the Twentieth Century, edited by Christopher Andrew, & David 
Dilks, 33-53. London: MacMillan, 1984. 
Andrew, Christopher. "Secret Intelligence and British Foreign Policy 1900-1939." In 
Intelligence and International Relations 1900-1945, edited by Christopher 
Andrew, & Jeremy Noakes, 9-28. Exeter: University of Exeter, 1987. 
"Arisue, Seizo." CIA FOIA Reading Room. Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act. n.d. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/519cd820993294098d516c4b 
(accessed January 22, 2018). 
Beasley, W.G., ed. Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy 1853-1868. London: 
Oxford University Press, 1960. 
Bennett, J.W., W.A. Hobart, and J.B. Spitzer. Intelligence and the Cryptanalytic 
Activities of the Japanese during World War II. Aegean Park Press, 1986. 
Blackburn, Kevin. "Reminiscence and War Trauma: Recalling the Japanese Occupation 
of Singapore, 1942-1945." Oral History (Oral History Society) 33, no. 2 (Autumn 
2005): 91-98. 
Bridges, Brian. "Britain and Japanese Espionage in Pre-War Malaya: The Shinozaki 




Burtness, Paul S., and Warren U. Ober. "Research Methodology: Problem of Pearl 
Harbor Intelligence Reports." Military Affairs (Soceity for Military History) 25, 
no. 3 (Autumn 1961): 132-146. 
Carlson, Elliot. Joe Rochefort's War: The Odyssey of the Codebreaker Who Outwitted 
Yamamoto at Midway. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2011.Chapman, J.W.M. 
"Japanese Inteligence 1919-1945: A Suitable Case for Treatment." In Intelligence 
and International Relations 1900-1945, edited by Christopher Andrew, & Jeremy 
Noakes, 145-190. Exeter: University of Exeter, 1987. 
Chapman, John W.M. "A Dance on Eggs: Intelligence and the 'Anti-Comintern'." Journal 
of Contemporary History 22, no. 2 (April 1987): 333-372. 
Coox, Alvin. "Japanese Net Assessment in the Era before Pearl Harbor." In Calculations: 
Net Assessment and the Coming of World War II, edited by Williamson Murray, 
& Allan R. Millett, 258-298. New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992. 
Donovan, Peter, and John Mack. Code Breaking in the Pacific. New York: Springer, 
2014. 
Dorwart, Jeffrey M. Conflict of Duty: U.S. Navy's Intelligence Dilemma, 1919-1945. 
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983. 
Drea, Edward. MacArthur's Ultra: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942-1945. 
Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1992. 
Drea, Edward. "Missing Intentions: Japanese Intelligence ad the Soviet Invasion of 
Manchuria, 1945." Military Affairs (Society for Military History) 48, no. 2 (April 
1984): 66-73. 
Drea, Edward. "Reading Each Others Mail: Japanese Communication Intelligence, 1920-
1945." The Journal for Military History 55, no. 2 (April 1991): 185-206. 
Duus, Peter. The Rise of Modern Japan. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976. 
Elphick, Peter. Far Eastern File: The Intelligence War in the Far East, 1930-1945. 
London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1997. 
—. Singapore: The Pregnable Fortress, A Study in Deception, Discord and Desertion. 




Elphick, Peter, and Michael Smith. Odd Man Out: The Story of the Singapore Traitor. 
London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1993. 
Everest-Phillips, Max. "The Pre-War Fear of Japanese Espionage: Its Impact and 
Legacy." Journal of Contemporary History 42, no. 2 (April 2007): 243-265. 
Fält, Olavi. "Collaboration between Japanese Intelligence and the Finnish underground 
during the Russo-Japanese war." Asian Profile 4, no. 2 (1976). 
Ford, Douglas. The Elusive Enemy: U.S. Naval Intelligence and the Imperial Japanese 
Fleet. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2011. 
Fujiwara, Iwaichi. F. Kikan: Japanese Army Intelligence Operations in Southeast Asia 
during World War II. Translated by Yoji Akashi. Hong Kong: Heinemann 
Educational Books Limited, 1983. 
Glass, Robert Rigby, and Phillip B. Davidson. Intelligence is for Commanders. 
Harrisburg: Military Service Pub. Co, 1948. 
Hackett, Roger F. Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838-1922. 
Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1971. 
Hart, B.H. Liddell. History of the Second World War. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 
1970. 
Hastings, Max. The Secret War. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2016. 
Holmes, W.J. Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific 
during World War II. Annapolis: Blue Jacket Books Naval Institute Press, 1979. 
Hore, Peter. The World Encyclopedia of Battleships. London: Hermes House, 2005. 
Iwashima, Hisao. Johosen ni Kanpai Shita (Japan's Total Defeat in the Intelligence War). 
Tokyo: Hara Shouhou, 1984. 
—. "Problems in Japan's Defense." Orientation Seminars on Japan No.9. Japan: Japan 
Foundation, Office for the Japanese Studies Center, 1982. 
Kahn, David. "Codebreaking in World Wars I and II: The Major Successes and Failures, 
Their Causes and Their Effects." The Historical Journal (Cambridge University 




—. The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing. New York: The MacMillan Company, 
1967. 
Kahn, David. "The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor." Foreign Affairs 70, no. 5 
(Winter 1991): 138-152. 
Kotani, Ken. Japanese Intelligence in World War II. Translated by Chiharu Kotani. 
Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2009. 
Kotani, Ken. "Japanese Intelligence in WWII: Successes and Failures." NIDS Security 
Reports, 2009: 1-27. 
Kratoska, Paul. The Japanese Occupation of Malaya: A Social and Economic History. 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998. 
Leng, Yuen Choy. "The Japanese Community in Malaya before the Pacific War: Its 
Genesis and Growth." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 9, no. 2 (September 
1978): 163-179. 
Matthews, Tony. Shadows Dancing: Japanese Espionage against the West, 1939-1945. 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. 
McClain, James L. A Modern History of Japan. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2002. 
Muir, Jr., Malcolm. "Rearming in a Vacuum: United Sates Navy Intelligence and the 
Japanese Capital Ship Threat, 1936-1945." The Journal of Military History 
(Society for Military History) 54, no. 4 (October 1990): 473-485. 
Nakamuda, Kenishi. Joho Shikan no Kaiso. Tokyo: Sonorama, 1985. 
Nish, Ian. "Japanese Intelligence 1894-1922." In Intelligence and International Relations 
1900-1945, edited by Christopher Andrew, & Jeremy Noakes, 127-144. Exeter: 
University of Exeter, 1987. 
Nish, Ian. "Japanese Intelligence and the Approach of the Russo-Japanese War." In The 
Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth 
Century, edited by Christopher Andrew, & David Dilks, 17-32. London: 




Onraet, René. Singapore-A Police Background. London: Dorothy Crisp and Co., 1947. 
Prados, John. Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and 
the Japanese Navy in World War II. New York: Random House, 1995. 
Roberts, Andrew. The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War. London, 
New York: Allen Lane, 2009. 
Rohwer, Jurgen. "Signal Intelligence in World War II: The Unfolding Story." The 
Journal of Military History 63, no. 4 (October 1999): 939-951. 
Seth, Michael J. A History of Korea: From Antiquity to the Present. Lanham: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 2010. 
Soustelle, Jasques. Daily Life of the Aztecs. New York: Dover Publications, 2011. 
Stinnett, Robert B. Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor. New York: 
The Free Press, 2000. 
Stone, Corin. U.S. National Inteligence: An Overview 2013. Washington D.C.: Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence, 2013. 
Tipton, Elise K. The Japanese Police State: The Tokko in Interwar Japan. Honolulu, 
Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1990. 
Tsuji, Masanobu, Howe, H.V. Japan's Greatest Victory, Britain's Worst Defeat. 
Translated by Margaret E. Lake. Cambridge: De Capo Press, 1997. 
—. Singapore 1941-1942: The Japanese Version of the Malayan Campaign of World 
War II. Translated by Margaret E. Lake. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961. 
Wukovits, John. World War II in Asia and the Pacific. Vol. 1, in A Companion to 
American Military History: War, The Armed Forces, edited by James C. Bradford, 
194-221. Chichester, West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2010. 
Young, Katsu H. "The Nomonhan Incident: Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union." 
Monumenta Nipponica (Sophia University) 22, no. 1/2 (1967): 82-102. 
 
